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LEGAL THEORY AND THE PIVOTAL ROLE 
OF THE CONCEPT OF COERCION 
DALE A. NANCE* 
This paper addresses an important problem in modern legal phi-
losophy: the problem of identifying the proper role of the concept of 
coercion in a general theory of the nature of law. The present state of 
philosophical art on this topic is the legacy of difficulties arising from a 
naive positivism - generally thought to have over-emphasized the 
role of coercive power. The resulting reaction in modern jurispru-
dence against the focus upon coercion reflects a failure to come to 
grips fully with the underlying methodological issues of descriptive 
legal theory. 
Basically, such descriptive theory seeks, or ought to seek, a criti-
cally informed understanding of law "as it is".** This pursuit requires 
that we make at least some effort to delineate the nature of this kind of 
understanding. Most importantly, one must seek to appreciate the rel-
evance of our normative deliberations concerning the use of coercion 
in informing our descriptive undertakings, in particular by helping to 
structure the analysis of basic legal concepts. Yet much, if not most, 
descriptive legal theory has ignored this relevance. 1 Especially in re-
• Assistant Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A. 1974, Rice University; J.D. 
1977, Stanford University; M.A. (Jurisprudence and Social Policy) 1982, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
•• The author has modified the conventions concerning punctuation in quotations in the interest 
of accuracy. Where punctuation marks are placed within quotations, they appear in the quoted text. 
I. In a review of H.L.A. Hart's recent work on Bentham, David Lyons observes: 
Much of Bentham's work was concerned with the analysis of legal concepts. By this I 
mean not the identification and interpretation of general principles that are embedded in 
the law but the explanation in more fundamental terms of the very idea of law and of the 
more specific ideas such as that of a legal right or obligation. Thus, Bentham was con-
cerned to reveal not just what the law of a particular jurisdiction at a given time requires 
and allows but also what it is for there to be law, what it is for someone to have a legal 
right, and so on. A good deal of work within legal philosophy was focused on such abstract 
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cent decades, such theory has become preoccupied with authority and 
rules to the virtual, though sometimes hesitant, rejection of coercion 
and coercive sanctions as phenomena of paramount theoretical con-
cern. 2 Thus, for example, a respected modem theorist has come to 
assert that the use of sanctions ultimately backed by force is "not a 
feature which forms part of our concept of law."3 
Relatedly, if not consequently, such theory displays a subtle ten-
dency toward a potentially authoritarian conservatism, the kind of 
conservatism exemplified by Lord Devlin in his disposition to find the 
law in popular morality.4 I hope to exemplify this tendency in what 
follows. For the present, suffice it to observe that it should not be 
surprising if the modem emphasis upon the structure and elements of 
morality and authoritative rules and deemphasis of the coercive aspect 
of law contribute to the distortion of the issues facing a legal decision-
maker, assuming that he or she has been exposed, directly or indi-
rectly, to the temper of modem legal philosophy. It seems to be a 
common, if tacit, view that such decisions proceed along something 
like the following moral program. First, one decides whether the ex-
tant state of affairs is optimal (or moral, or just). If not, something 
must be done. That something, of course, is to enact a law. Once one 
decides to do that, coercive sanctions must naturally be imposed to 
ensure the compliance of recalcitrants. 5 This program is flawed in a 
questions. But the connections between this seemingly pure theoretical inquiry and the 
moral concerns or commitments of legal philosophers have not been systematically 
explored. 
Lyons, Founders and Foundations of Legal Positivism (Book Review), 82 MICH. L. REV. 722, 727 
(1984). 
2. The general trend of modem theory is summarized well by Jerome Hall: 
There is disagreement as to whether the sanction is an essential part of law, and among 
those who hold that the sanction is essential, there is disag~eement not only regarding its 
properties but also whether the sanction of positive law is unique. The puzzlement is in-
creased by the fact that natural law philosophers like Aquinas and Kant agree with legal 
positivists like Austin and Kelsen that the sanction is an essential part of law. And adding 
to that puzzle is the recent agreement by distinguished representatives of those opposed 
philosophies, that the sanction is not an essential part of positive law [citing Fuller and 
Hart], although they also agree that there must be sanctions somewhere in the legal system. 
J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 101 (1973). 
3. J. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 159 (1975). Elsewhere, however, Raz asserts, "The 
three most general and important features of the law are that it is normative, institutionalized, and 
coercive . . . . Naturally, every theory of a legal system must be compatible with an explanation of 
these features." J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2d ed. 1980). 
4. SeeP. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). The tendency remains notwithstand-
ing criticism of legal moralism by such prominent figures of modem jurisprudence as H. L.A. Hart. See 
H. L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963). See also Bark, Tradition and !Yfora/ity in Con-
stitutional Law (AM. ENTERPRISE INST.) (1984). 
5. I call this the "It ain't right - there oughta be a law!" approach, although this is somewhat 
misleading in highlighting the populist version of the program. Certainly among jurists other versions 
are more common. Whatever the details of their programs, however, it is significant that "[m]odem 
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!985] COERCION AND LEGAL THEORY 3 
number of respects, most importantly in that it rests upon an unrea-
sonable assumption that the propriety of a prohibition, injunction, or 
other legal action can be determined without serious regard to the 
sanction which is associated with the action in question. A better 
statement of the program which should be followed runs something 
like this: having identified suboptimality in the extant state of affairs, 
one must decide whether it is proper - morally permissible and 
pragmatically prudent - to use coercive force in aid of various de-
signs to change things, given the character or kind of suboptimality 
involved and given the probability of improving matters by the at-
tempt. In particular, the decision-maker cannot then ignore or slide 
over the fact that the decision being made is a decision about the em-
ployment or potential employment of coercive power, with all the 
careful reluctance that this should entail. 6 
It is in response to these problems that the following comments 
are directed. However, I will not here attempt to detail the flaws of 
the program of decision-making just criticized or to defend in detail 
the pragmatistic one suggested as a substitute.7 Nor will I attempt to 
prove that any particular theory of law leads, inevitably or probably, to 
legal philosophers who exclude the sanction from their concept of law are apt to concede that the use of 
force is sometimes necessary, but that is minimized as a merely practical matter or as otherwise insignif-
icant." J. HALL, supra note 2, at 115. 
6. The pragmatism involved is quite familiar to lawyers in the form of the right/remedy distinc-
tion. it is a common observation that one cannot make much headway in the analysis of the legal right> 
of the parties to a lawsuit without attending to the remedy or remedies sought. This point- some-
times not initially obvious to students - is reflected in virtually every modern textbook for first-year 
law courses by the early introduction of materials, in greater or lesser depth, concerning remedies and 
(particularly in the non-criminal context) their origins in the common law writs. Compare, e.g., J. 
0UKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 5-8 {1981) with C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER, & P. MARTIN, PROP-
ERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 60-66, 71-76, 90-96 (2d ed. 
1983). As further examples, see J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER, & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 17-19, Ch. 4 (4th ed. 1985); W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 1-3 (7th ed. 1982); 
L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW {3d ed. 1972; compare 4th ed. 1981). Of course, 
a sophisticated approach can distinguish, and might successfully separate, the decision as to whether a 
coercive remedy of some type is appropriate (i.e., the legal "right" issue) from the decision as to which 
coercive remedy is called for (i.e., the legal "remedy" issue). See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS§ I {5th ed. 1984); cf D. DoBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 1.2 (1973). 
In any event, the indicated focus upon the "remedy" issue highlights the ultimately coercive aspect of 
the "right" issue; this is so despite the fact that the remedy is not necessarily itself a coercive act, but 
may only be the declaration of a (remedial) duty which is backed by (the threat of) coercive acts in the 
event of noncompliance. To avoid misunderstanding, it should be clarified that I do not claim that 
every identifiable rule which is commonly called a "law" is backed by a coercive sanction, but only that 
what is crucially important about the rules not so backed is their relationship to other rules which are. 
As an example, consider the "laws" that determine how a legislative bill itself becomes law. Cf J. 
HALL, supra note 2, Ch. V. 
7. A useful beginning point would be Lawrence Becker's "root idea of a right": 
The existence of a right is the existence of a state of affairs in which one person (the right-
holder) has a claim on an act or forbearance from another person (the duty-bearer) in the 
sense that, should the claim be exercised or in force, and the act or forbearance not be done, 
4 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW (Vol. 57 
the flawed program. These matters I leave largely to the reader's rea-
sonable inference, though some suggestive comments will be made. 
They are mentioned primarily to motivate the discussion of the meth-
odological problem first described. Even in that regard, I will not 
claim to present a complete solution to the problems presented. My 
efforts will be limited to outlining basic ideas which may help to defuse 
some long-standing jurisprudential controversies and provide a frame-
work within which better solutions may be constructed. In part I, I 
begin the development of the significance of normative deliberations 
for the methodology of legal theory by identifying a crucial prelimi-
nary issue. That issue is the threshold question of the proper scope of 
legal inquiry, itself one aspect of the most general and persistent ques-
tion in descriptive legal theory, namely "What is law?" It will be ar-
gued that coercion is a crucial element in the specification of such 
scope of inquiry. In part II, a critical analysis of traditional positivist 
and natural law theories will be used to clarify and further develop the 
proposed approach. Finally, in part III, the results of the analysis will 
be recapitulated with a discussion of some reservations and potential 
objections. 
I. NORMATIVE DELIBERATIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL 
THEORY 
In attempting to answer the important question "What is law?", a 
crucial observation, though occasionally made, has yet to be suffi-
ciently developed. 8 The point may be reviewed by considering the fol-
lowing, comparatively innocuous question: Why is the term 'house' 
not usually defined (or used) to include the first twenty feet of ground 
below the erected structure? Or, for that matter, a piece of the moon? 
One might respond: "Well it certainly could have been, but it just 
wasn't. Why ask the question? The choice, whether explicitly or im-
plicitly made, was arbitrary, one made simply for the sake of having 
some basis for mutual understanding." Indeed, the choice does not 
seem to be logically necessitated. Nevertheless, the response surely 
misses the point, because the choice was not arbitrary, if by that one 
means that there is no reason (other than simply having some conven-
tion) not to include twenty feet of soil in the term 'house'. The crucial 
it would be justifiable, other things being equal, to use coercive measures to extract either 
the performance required or compensation in lieu of that performance. 
L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 8 (1977). See a/so Becker, Three Types 
ofRights, 13 GA. L. REV. 1197(1979). 
8. That the question posed is an important question can be established by arguments not funda-
mentally inconsistent with the approach developed here. See, e.g., J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 7-13 (1984). 
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realization is that 'house' does not include the twenty feet below be-
cause such a concept or convention would not (ordinarily) be a useful 
one; in any event, it would not (ordinarily) be the most useful one. 9 In 
fact, most (if not all) meanings, including stipulative definitions, reflect 
the purposes and values which are common to some group of commu-
nicating humans. Such shared purpose is what gives the communica-
tion its value. 10 
Where the complexity or multiplicity of purposes which are re-
flected in a language, or part thereof, is great, the inherent ambiguity 
of the important words is also great. 11 This is the case with the con-
cept of 'law' or that of 'legal system', as compared with 'house', for 
example. As a consequence, if one attempts to unravel, explicate, or 
define concepts of great corresponding complexity and multiplicity of 
empirical purpose, there will be a significant need for clarification of 
purpose. Any choice among various alternative purposes is itself sub-
ject to evaluation and criticism. If, therefore, one asks "What is law?" 
or "What is a legal system?", he might legitimately be answered at first 
with another question, such as: "What is the purpose of your in·· 
quiry?" Or, derivatively: "What are the criteria of success of your 
investigation?" 12 
Professor Hart is one who has recognized, though incompletely 
accommodated, these observations. He says of the analytical or defini-
tional problems of jurisprudence: 
... [t]oo little has been said about the criteria for judging the 
adequacy of a definition of law. Should such a definition state 
what, if anything, the plain man intends to convey when he uses 
the expressions "law" or "legal system"? Or should it rather aim 
to provide, by marking off certain social phenomena from others, a 
9. Of course, especially outside of everyday discourse, there could be circumstances in which such 
a concept would be useful. For a discussion of the ramifications of the differences in the interpretation 
of law between "lay" terminology and "technical" terminology, see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977). 
10. For example, it can be shown that the "units" for measurement of temporal and spatial inter-
vals are "arbitrary" in the sense of not being necessitated by either purely logical considerations or 
empirical facts. Nevertheless, the units chosen, as well as the stipulative definitions of congruence at a 
distance and uniformity of time, are. subject to criticism on the basis of the implications for the formula-
tion of physical laws. Descriptive simplicity is the critical consideration here. See H. REICHENBACH, 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPACE AND TIME§§ 4-6, 17 (1958). More generally, seeR. ROBINSON, DEFINI-
TION (1950). 
11. See H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954). 
12. The legal philosopher with probably the earliest and keenest appreciation of these observa-
tions was Hermann Kantorowicz, who summarized their import in the phrase "conceptual pragma-
tism". See H. KANTOROWICZ, THE DEFINITION OF LAW (1958). Unfortunately, his narrow purpose 
of developing the conceptual basis of a history of juristic thought led him to a slightly narrower concep-
tion of law than that developed here. 
6 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
classification useful or illuminating for theoretical purposes? 13 
Implicitly, one purpose of an objective investigator might be to cata-
logue the purposes of "plain men" and how each is reflected in the 
linguistic "carving" of reality. 14 Moreover, there is no obvious reason 
to limit oneself to the purposes of plain men. A "science" of law, so 
conceived, should also include in the catalogue the purposes and con-
sequent conceptions of non-plain men- intellectuals, politicians, law-
yers, criminals(!), and so on. Each has a perspective to contribute. 15 
The nature of theoretical deliberations would be clearer if this were 
kept in mind: one of the catalogued definitions, or yet some other, 
might be best for illuminating such deliberations. 16 
If we heed· Hart's correct suggestion, we may ask what defini-
tional lines should be drawn, as a "rational reconstruction" of ordi-
nary usage, 17 so as to mark off 'legal phenomena' for theoretical study. 
And preliminarily, we may ask what criteria for making such a choice 
should be employed. I suggest two. First, the field of investigation 
should not be prematurely narrowed by the definitional borders of 
legal phenomena. In other words, a relatively "weak" definition or 
liberally inclusive scope of inquiry should be employed, within which 
more discriminating theories can be developed. Second, the primacy 
of practical deliberations should inform our theorizing. It is my thesis 
that these two criteria best reflect the purposes of a rational inquiry 
into the nature of law. The first reflects the purposes of neutrality and 
13. H. L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 2-3. Elsewhere, Hart gives what he optimistically considers to 
be the basic conception of an "educated man", but he does not investigate the purposes which underlie 
such a conception, and he specifically rejects it as an adequate account for his (presumably theoretical) 
purposes. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 2-5 (1961). 
14. [O]ur common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth draw-
ing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: 
these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long 
test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably 
practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an after-
noon - the most favored alternative method. 
J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 130 (1961). 
15. A similar point is made by John Finnis in beginning his perceptive analysis of the problems of 
descriptive legal theory. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 1-2 (1980). 
16. Certainly ordinary language has no claim to be the last word, if there is such a thing. It 
embodies, indeed, something better than the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely, ... , the 
inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men. But then, that acumen has 
been concentrated primarily upon the practical business of life. If a distinction works well for 
practical purposes in ordinary life (no mean feat, for even ordinary life is full of hard cases), 
then there is sure to be something in it, it will not mark nothing: yet this is likely enough to be 
not the best way of arranging things if our interests are more extensive or intellectual than the 
ordinary. 
J. AUSTIN, supra note 14, at 133. 
17. On "rational reconstruction" oflegal terminology, see J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note 
8, at 2-4. 
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1985] COERCION AND LEGAL THEORY 7 
objectivity, a desire not to prejudge the normative and empirical con-
nections to be developed, as well as a modesty, born of experience, 
with regard to our ability to cut to the heart of the matter by a simple 
definitional exercise. 18 The second reflects the belief that normative 
concerns cannot be ignored even in the building of a descriptive theory 
oflaw. "A general theory of law must be normative as well as concep-
tual."19 The two dimensions must inform one another; neither can be 
profitably pursued in isolation. In fact, they are different components 
of the same general enterprise. 20 As Lon Fuller opined in the early 
fifties (and thereafter): 
In attempting to outline briefly what seem to me to be the needs of 
legal philosophy in this country, I start with a pragmatic concep-
tion of the function of philosophy. As I see it, the object of legal 
philosophy is to give an effective and meaningful direction to the 
work of lawyers, judges, legislators, and law teachers. If it leaves 
the activities of these men untouched, if it has no implications for 
the question of what they do with their working days, then legal 
philosophy is a failure. 21 
18. A similar point is emphasized by Professors Nonet and Selznick in distinguishing between 
"'weak definitions" and the "strong theories" which are to be built thereon. See P. NoNET & P. SELZ-
NICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 8-18 (1978). Cf H. 
KANTOROWICZ, supra note 12, at II; Introduction, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 16-19 (K. 
Winston ed. 1981 ). The basic idea is traced by Mortimer and Sanford Kadish to: 
... a simple precept of what Charles Sanders Peirce called the logical conscience. In order 
to avoid blocking the way of inquiry, this precept warns us not to employ restrictive defini-
tions that exclude real possibilities from consideration. Theories about the nature of legal 
systems, from which are derived all sorts of propositions about the entitlements of defend-
ants, the obligations of officials, and the nature of proper judicial reasoning, run the same 
risk as theories about the nature of art - namely, that substantive choices of particular 
programs in the domain will be defended on the basis of a prescribed concept of the do-
main. In such a case the need for a defense has been obviated. The commitments justifying 
one's substantive choices have been implanted in the theory and then read out from the 
theory as discoveries. 
M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 217-18 {1973). Cf Honore, Groups, Laws, and 
Obedience, in OxFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (2d series) 1-2 {A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973). 
19. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii (1978). The implicit identification made in the 
text of "'practical" and "'normative" indicates the use herein of the term "'practical" in the broadly 
normative sense of "with a view to decision and action" rather than the more narrowly instrumental 
sense of "'workable" or "'efficient". This follows J. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 12. See generally J. R.Az, 
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS {1975). 
20. Early modern recognition of the interdependence of the social scientist's normative concerns 
and his descriptive theory, even (or at least) in the very selection of concepts to be employed, is to be 
found in the works of Weber. See MAX WEBER ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 24, 
58, 76-82 (E. Shils & H. Finch ed. 1949); M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
(!949) . 
2!. L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 249-50 {K. Winston ed. !981 ). As will be 
evident in what follows, Fuller's point is somewhat too narrow in focusing only upon the practical 
issues facing members of the "'legal" profession. Cf D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 7 
(!977): "'The ultimate concern of the philosophy of law ... is to guide us in making normative deci-
sions regarding laws and our relation, as individuals, to laws." 
8 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
A derivative thesis is the following: Questions about what ought 
to be undertaken with the aid of coercion, or required subject to coer-
cive sanctions, and how individuals ought to respond to such under-
takings and requirements by others are critical, indeed the most 
important, practical concerns which underlie our study of law and 
which ought, therefore, to inform our theorizing, including our defini-
tional (scope of inquiry) formulations. As Ronald.Dworkin has put it: 
Day in and day out we send people to jail, or take money away 
from them, or make them do things they do not want to do, under 
coercion of force, and we justify all of this by speaking of such 
. persons as having broken the law or having failed to meet their 
legal obligations, or having interfered with other people's legal 
rights. Even in clear cases (a bank robber or a willful breach of 
contract), when we are confident that someone had a legal obliga-
tion and broke it, we are not able to give a satisfactory account of 
what that means, or why that entitles the state to punish or coerce 
him?2 
Consequently, in order to bring legal theory to focus upon the crucial 
practical issues concerning law, I suggest a modification of the prevail-
ing theories to include within the scope of inquiry all coercive human 
interactions, by which I mean, roughly, interactions in which either 
coercion is intentionally and directly employed by a person against 
another or there is a reasonable fear of such employment. 
Before beginning to address the more serious difficulties which 
may be thought to occasion this suggestion, it may be helpful to make 
a brief comment on the present use of the term 'coercion'. 
Paradigmatically, by 'coercion' I refer to the direct use of physical 
force or the threat of such force to .. obtain compliance with rules, com-
mands, directives, etc. It is not necessary for the purposes of this pa-
per to examine in detail the nature and kinds of coercion or the 
relationship of the concept(s) of coercion to that of 'sanction'.23 It is 
22. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 19, at 15. Professor Hart makes the point more precisely, if less 
graphically: 
[W]e are committed at least to the general critical principle that the use of legal coercion by 
any society calls for justification as something prima facie objectionable to be tolerated only 
for the sake of some countervailing good. 
H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 20. See also J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 4-9, 20-22 (1973) 
(discussing "The Presumptive Case for Liberty"); cf Westen, Freedom and Coercion - Virtue Words 
and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J.- (forthcoming). 
23. See generally Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SciENCE AND METHOD: EssAYS IN HONOR 
OF ERNEST NAGEL 440-72 (S. Morgenbesser, ed. 1969); COERCION, NOMOS XIV (J.R. Pennock & 
J. W. Chapman, ed. 1972); J. HALL, supra note 2, Ch. V; Oberdiek, The Role of Sanctions and Coercion 
in Understanding Law and Legal Systems, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 71 (1976). Obviously, these citations are 
not intended to express agreement with everything to be found in these works. Indeed, the implications 
of the arguments presented here may include substantial revisions of the insights therein adduced. 
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sufficient merely to indicate the centrality of such examinations in an 
adequate jurisprudence. The most obvious distinctions which could be 
elaborated are (i) that between physical and non-physical coercion24 
and (ii) that between using coercion directly, e.g., overt or disguised 
threats, and indirectly, by which I have in mind the implicit "threats" 
which attend even the most cooperative kinds of interactions by virtue 
of the existence of a background set of coercively backed rules. Thus, 
for example, the simple sale of a nonessential consumer good may 
have involved the parties' reliance upon the coercively backed rules 
concerning theft, concerning an owner's power to alienate property, 
and perhaps more. Though these rules and their enforcement cer-
tainly are legal phenomena, the transaction itself is not - though, of 
course, it will have legal consequences by virtue of the change of own-
ership. Thus, even the sale of a "necessity" by a "monopolist", where 
some may wish to assert the employment of coercion, is not coercion 
in the direct sense, although there may have been or may be coercion 
in the creation and maintenance of the monopoly. 25 Of course, there 
will be many hard cases. As others have said, it need not be our inten-
tion to provide a "litmus test" for legal phenomena, but rather to push 
the fuzzy cases away from some central areas of proper concern. 26 
24. Much attention is paid to this distinction in the discussions cited in the previous note, 
although many of these discussions suffer from too great an attachment to (supposedly) ordinary lan-
guage usage. The special significance of physical coercion and the realistic threat thereof contained 
within most legal sanctions is manifested, to a greater or lesser extent, in a wide variety of legal doc-
trines. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (holding not justiciable a declaratory judgment 
action by a doctor and several patients challenging constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting use of 
contraceptives). In reply to the fact of the doctor's sworn testimony that as a law-abiding citizen he 
was deterred by the statute, the court's opinion reads: -
We cannot agree that if Dr. Buxton's compliance with these statutes is uncoerced by the 
risk of their enforcement, his patients are entitled to a declaratory judgment concerning the 
statutes' validity. And, with due regard to Dr. Buxton's standing as a physician and to his 
personal sensitiveness, we cannot accept, as the basis of constitutional adjudication, other 
than as chimerical the fear of enforcement of provisions that have during so many years 
gone uniformly and without exception unenforced. 
!d. at 508 (plurality opinion by Frankfurter, J.). Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(subsequent criminal action brought against same doctor; criminal prohibition held unconstitutional). 
The general problem of non-enforcement instantiated by the cited cases is discussed in Bonfield, The 
Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Non-enforcement, 49 IOWA L. REv. 389 (1964). 
25. Similar issues have been encountered by the courts in determining whether "state action" has 
occurred for purposes of the application of constitutional protections of certain individual rights. See 
generally Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (reviewing various theories and refusing to 
find requisite state action in private sale by warehouseman, pursuant to§ 7-210 of New York Uniform 
Commercial Code, to enforce lien on goods stored). Of course, the analogy is not intended to suggest 
that a social phenomenon qualifying as law under the coercion test ought to be considered state action 
for the purposes of constitutional analysis. A more sophisticated interrelationship would have to be 
developed here. 
26. Cf H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 16-17 (1961). The point may be expressed by saying that 
we wish to delineate a fuzzy set (law or legal system) within the domain of social phenomena in such a 
manner as to assure that phenomena of closely related moral concerns peculiar to the law are given a 
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Putting this matter of the meaning of coercion aside, let us turn to 
issues of more frequent jurisprudential controversy. 
II. COMPARISONS TO OTHER APPROACHES 
The classically positivist sound of my proposal, reemphasizing as 
it does the coercive element of law, may strike those who are well 
versed in modern legal philosophy as entailing a rejection of the great 
strides forward since Austin and Kelsen (the preeminent classical posi-
tivists), strides attributable to the efforts of legal theorists such as 
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller. This would be an erroneous impression, 
principally because my proposed inclusion of coercive interaction is 
not exclusive of other social phenomena. In order to make plain the 
nature of these connections, to elucidate and substantiate the theses 
put forward in the previous section and to demonstrate their relevance 
to the controversies of modern legal philosophy, it will be useful to 
survey briefly some relevant features of the two principal schools of 
thought in Occidental jurisprudence, legal positivism and natural law. 
In view of the character of the present proposal, we will take as a focus 
the extent and rationale of the attempts by preeminent scholars within 
these traditions to rule "out-of-bounds" the simple coercive interac-
tion of the robber with his victim. 27 Although no comprehensive cri-
tique of these scholars is intended, we will be looking to their 
theoretical purposes, broadly conceived, and suggesting the strengths 
and weaknesses in the success criteria which have been adopted, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, for specifying the scope of theoretical inquiry 
into law. 
A. The Positivist Tradition 
The prominent legal positivist writers give us only clues as to 
their positions on the methodological questions raised here. One thing 
is clear enough: the touchstone of positivism is the distinction between 
description and prescription, in large part a rejection of classical teleo-
logical metaphysics. 28 In the context of jurisprudence, this is mani-
fested as an insistence upon a distinction between "analytical 
jurisprudence" and "normative jurisprudence", the former being con-
high grade of membership in the fuzzy set. See D. DUBOIS & H. PRADE, Fuzzy SETS AND SYSTEMS: 
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1980). 
27. In one weak sense, none of the authors to be discussed fails to include the robber within the 
scope of inquiry: namely, each in fact discusses the interaction of the robber and victim. But the 
discussion is rather consistently devoted to a linguistically "analytical" or definitional exclusion based 
upon inadequately explained grounds, as the following text will demonstrate. 
28. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 180 et seq. (1961). See also J. FINNIS, supra note 15, Ch. 
II. 
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cerned with the analysis of the concepts and structures of "law as it 
is", the latter being concerned with evaluative criticism of law.29 Un-
fortunately, there has been a temptation to overstate the distinction 
and thus to ignore the relationships developed in the preceding sec-
tion, to believe that descriptive theory can and should be undertaken 
without any analytical recourse to the theorist's normative concerns. 
As prominent examples, we will briefly consider the work of John 
Austin, Hans Kelsen, and H.L.A. Hart. 
Austin 
Austin's conception of law is a system ("society") in which there 
exists a determinate group of persons, the sovereign, the general com-
mands of which are habitually obeyed by others in the community and 
which is not in the habit of obeying anyone else.30 Although the coer-
cive power of the sovereign's commands is an integral part of Austin's 
theory, Austin might nevertheless reject the gunman's action as an in-
stance of legal phenomena on at least three grounds. The first might 
be that the notion of a "command" entails authority, something which 
the gunman lacks. However, even though Austin does speak of "supe-
riority" and "inferiority" as implicit in commands, he clarifies that the 
relationship involved must be understood in terms of power, rather 
than authority. 31 This manifests Austin's positivistic effort to define 
law in wholly non-evaluative terms. Indeed, building the notion of 
authority into the very definition of law would seem to prejudge or 
require prejudgment of crucial normative or descriptive issues, e.g., 
whether and to what extent a particular social rule or system has au-
thority. 32 This surely is inappropriate if our goal is to set out the scope 
of an (open-minded) inquiry, as indeed the very title of Austin's work 
29. See. e.g., J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note 8, at I, 22. Aside from the separation of 
analytical jurisprudence from normative jurisprudence, the identification of the essential features of 
positivism is extremely problematic. Many philosophers regard the unifying theme of analytical posi-
tivism to be the insistence upon having a purely formal test for determining the legal validity of a given 
rule, i.e. a test which is independent of the content of the rule. For example: "Whatever X says is the 
law is the law." Thus, X is said to posit the law. As a reaction to classical natural law, there is also a 
demand for a test which is independent of divine sanction (vt:Z., X # God) and of authority inherent in 
other non-human sources (viz., X # Nature). See generally id. at 13-38. 
30. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954) (first 
published in 1832). 
31. !d. at 24-25. 
32. For such reasons, Hart reconstructs Austin's terminology by referring to "orders backed by 
threats" rather than "commands". H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 19-20 (1961). On the controversial 
character of legal authority, compare Ladenson, In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law, 9:2 
PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 134 (1980) with Raz, Authority and Justification, 14:1 PHIL AND PUB. AFF. 3 
(1985). 
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indicates. 33 
The second and third grounds are related: for the gunman situa-
tion to exemplify law, Austin would say, the gunman would have to be 
coercively dominant ("sovereign") in the "society" and proceed, at 
least in part, by the use of generalized orders, like "Pay over half your 
earnings each month." These are not usually, or at least not invaria-
bly, the characteristics of gunmen. It is Austin's use of these charac-
teristics which leads Hart to call Austin's conception the "gunman 
situation writ large". 34 The reaction which I hope the reader will have 
at this point is to ask: "How are these descriptive or definitional char-
acteristics normatively relevant?" The positivist's answer would pre-
sumably be: "They aren't, at least not necessarily; but they are 
relevant to a science of law." But what could this mean? If, as might 
appear to be the case, Austin is simply engaging in a reproduction of 
ordinary usage of the term 'law', then he is subject to the criticism, 
discussed in the previous section of this paper, that such an historio-
graphic approach requires theoretical justification. 35 If, on the other 
hand, Austin's conception is intended as useful for theoretical pur-
poses, we find ourselves at a loss as to what those purposes might be. 
It cannot be the basic positivist purpose of removing value-laden con-
cepts from a descriptive theory of law; nothing "value-laden" is re-
moved by restricting attention from the general class of commands to 
those involving large scale coercive dominance and generalized orders. 
33. It may be worthwhile distinguishing my approval of Austin on this point from that of many 
antagonists of the (supposedly) classical natural law approach. The latter would come about in some-
thing like the following way. It would be observed that the employment of an evaluative notion of 
authority (or, a purely "pedigree" notion of authority - i.e., traceability to the sovereign - coupled 
with an evaluative conception of sovereignty) would be subject to the same criticism as such natural law 
theory: they each identify law with morally good (or authoritative) law and thereby violate our (ordi-
nary language or) common sense of the meaningfulness of phrases like "morally bad (unauthoritative) 
law." See, e.g., J. MURPHY & J. CoLEMAN, supra note 8, at 17-19. But this argument begs the ques-
tion. Unless the proper purpose of legal theory is to reproduce our ordinary language usages, i.e. to 
reproduce the meaningfulness of its phrases, the natural lawyer's limitation of law to authoritative 
regimes cannot be rejected simply on the ground that it fails to consider iniquitous regimes (like that of 
Nazi Germany) as involving law where (at least some peoples') ordinary language would so classify 
them. (Compare the similar way in which Hart begs the question of the distinguishability of the gun-
man from law by focusing on our common sense of "obligation". I d. at 24-25. Moreover, one might 
attempt to avoid this problem by clearly specifying a purely non-evaluative notion of authority. The 
matter is complicated (see infra note 58), and this very fact argues strongly for the simple, non-evalua-
tive specification of the scope of inquiry that Austin was trying to provide, leaving these difficult ques-
tions to be resolved at the level of theory construction. 
34. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, at 7, Ch. II (1961); J. MURPHY & J. CoLEMAN, supra note 
8, at 25-27, 31. 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16. In fact, Austin recognizes that his conceptualiza-
tion does involve a modification of ordinary language. E.g., J. AUSTIN, supra note 30, at 19, 20-21. 
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If anythi.ng, something value-laden is added. 36 
It is important to observe that these critical questions are radi-
cally different in tenor from the now well-received criticisms of Aus-
tin's theory. H. L.A. Hart, for example, accepts the restrictions based 
upon coercive dominance and generality as necessary to Austin's the-
ory, and even adds further elements so as to better repmduce our com-
mon-sense notions about law, arguing that Austin's theory is not 
"sufficient to account for two salient features of most legal systems: 
the continuity of the authority to make law possessed by a succession 
of different legislators, and the persistence of laws long after their 
maker and those who rendered him obedience have perished."37 Now, 
the same objections which were raised above with regard to Austin 
can clearly be made against Hart's reconstructive elaboration of Aus-
tin's theory. And we can point to the primary source of the difficulty: 
Hart expects both too much and too little from a definition of law. 
"Too much" in the sense that there is no reason to expect a definition 
to provide us an "account" of all the features (even "salient" ones) of 
"most" legal systems, certainly not without the addition of other con-
cepts. "Too little" in the sense that a definition should not exclude 
from consideration social phenomena which do not have, for example, 
the continuity of many modern legal systems. 38 
Kelsen 
Kelsen proceeds in a fashion somewhat similar to Austin, but we 
are able to identify something more concrete about his underlying pur-
poses. In the first place, Kelsen rightly perceives that, despite the 
"constitutive" aspect of even scientific cognition, 39 a descriptive sci-
ence of law must attempt to avoid ideological bias.4° Further, he ap-
pears to ·distinguish between setting the scope of inquiry and 
developing a theory therein, for he writes: "[A] theory of law must 
begin by defining its object matter. " 41 Kelsen then proceeds as 
follows: 
To arrive at a definition of law, it is convenient to start from the 
usage of language, that is, to determine the meaning of the word 
36. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY Of LAW 46-49 {rev. ed. !969) {discussing the "general-
ity•· of law as one of the elements of law's "internal morality"). 
37. H.L.A. HART, supra note 13, Chs. II-IV {196!). 
38. See Gibbs, Definitions of LaiV and Empirical Questions, 2 LAW & Soc. REV. 429 (!968). It 
can also be persuasively argued that Austin's theory is not so deficient in explaining the persistence and 
continuity of modem legal systems as Hart claims. See Ladenson, supra note 32, at 145-57. 
39. H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW§ 26 {!967) (first published in !934). 
40. Id. 
4!. Id. at 30. 
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"law" as equivalent to the German word Recht, French droit, Ital-
ian diritto. Our task will be to examine whether the social phe-
nomena described by these words have common characteristics by 
which they may be distinguished from similar phenomena, and 
whether these characteristics are significant enough to serve as ele-
ments for a concept of social-scientific cognition.42 
Thus, taking common language merely as a "convenient" starting 
place, Kelsen arrives at two features of law which are characteristic 
and significant: (1) these "objects" are systems of norms for human 
behavior (i.e. "social orders"); and (2) they are coercive.43 He specifi-
cally, and reasonably, rejects certain other characteristics as defini-
tional on account of their variability. 44 This basic result will be seen to 
be similar to that at which we will ultimately arrive in this paper.45 
However, from this relatively sound beginning, l{elsen goes off 
the track by building into his conception of a coercive social order 
something which is not entailed by either of the two specified dimen-
sions. A requirement of effectiveness ("by and large") of the system 
arises from (i) Kelsen's claim that one cannot have a "system" of 
norms without a basic norm with reference to which the validity of the 
other norms is determined and which itself is simply "presupposed",46 
together with (ii) his claim that an ineffective norm cannot be presup-
posed. Thus Kelsen distinguishes the robber gang from a legal system 
in the following way: 
Why is the coercive order that constitutes the community of the 
robber gang and comprises the internal and external order not in-
42. I d. at 30-3 I. 
43. Jd. §§ 6a-6b. Kelsen has been criticized for taking the "lowest common denominator" ap-
proach to defining law by looking simply to the one feature or set of features present in all ordinary 
language applications. See, e.g., I. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 5-6, 9-10. Although Kelsen does not 
explain his criteria of "significance", it is clear that something more is involved than this criticism 
admits. Kelsen, despite his well-known ethical subjectivism, must contemplate "significance" in the 
coercive aspect of law. That this is a normative significance is suggested by Kelsen's insistence that a 
definition of law which does not "determine law as a coercive order, must be rejected ... because 
coercion is a factor of great importance for the cognition of social relationships ... particularly, be-
cause by defining law as a coercive order, a connection is accounted for that exists in the case most 
important for the cognition of the law, the law of the modern state: the connection between law and 
state. The modern state is essentially a coercive order .... " H. KELSEN, supra note 39, at 54. This, 
according to Kelsen, has at least the normative significance of undercutting "one of the most effective 
ideologies of legitimacy" which seeks to "justify the state through the law". Jd. at 318-19. See gener-
ally id. Ch. VI. 
44. The existence of a monopoly on the use of force is so rejected (H. KELSEN, supra note 39, at 
35-37) as is the securing of peace often associated therewith (id. at 37-39). 
45. See infra text accompanying note I 59. The principal differences will be seen to lie in my 
claims that (a) the two features should be expressed in terms of concrete human action rather than as 
an abstract system of rules, and (b) the two features should be listed in the disjunctive, specifying two 
sufficient conditions for identifying legal phenomena. 
46. H. KELSEN, supra note 39, § 34. See also id. at 31. 
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terpreted as a legal order? Why is the subjective meaning of this 
coercive order (that one ought to behave in conformity with it) not 
interpreted as its objective meaning? Because no basic norm is pre-
supposed according to which one ought to behave in conformity 
with this order. But why is no such basic norm presupposed? Be-
cause this order does not have the lasting effectiveness without 
which no basic norm is presupposed. The robber's coercive order 
does not have this effectiveness, if the norms of the legal order in 
whose territorial sphere of validity the gang operates are actually 
applied to the robbers' activity as being illegal behavior; if the 
members of the gang are deprived of their liberty or their lives by 
coercive acts that are interpreted as imprisonment and death 
sentences; and if thus the activity of the gang is terminated - in 
short, if the coercive order regarded as the legal order is more ef-
fective than the coercive order constituting the gang.47 
15 
It is not explained why a norm which is not "lastingly effective" is not 
presupposed. This appears to be an empirical claim about the behav-
ior of "norm presupposing". If so, it holds little promise for Kelsen, 
who acknowledges that presupposition is person-specific; what is a 
legal system is, to that extent, very much in the eyes of the beholder, 
or rather the mind of the presupposer.48 There is little warrant for a 
claim that individuals cannot presuppose a norm simply because it is 
not "lastingly effective". And any recourse to presupposition by a ma-
jority or by a powerful minority would raise comparably unsupport-
able claims of equally dubious relevancy. Such aU-or-nothing 
conceptions are strange notions to build into a descriptive theory.49 In 
the end, one is left to ponder the peculiarity of Kelsen's claim, based 
upon some notion of comparative effectiveness, that were the robbers 
able to dominate a given geographical region, their system could be 
regarded as a legal system, their community as a "state". 50 It would 
seem to reflect an unstated, unnecessary, and indefensible Austinian 
position that for any given region, there can be only one legal system. 
The normative relevance of such a counter-intuitive restriction upon 
47. Id. at 47-48. It should be mentioned that Kelsen also argues that the single command of the 
gunman is not law because law is not a single norm but a system of norms. Id. at 47. This argument 
fails for the same reason that it would be wrong to say that, in mathematics, a collection of one object 
cannot be a "set": a single command can be a "system", albeit an extremely simple one. There is no 
obvious normative consideration which would serve to distinguish such a simple system from more 
complex ones. 
48. Id. at 204 n.72. 
49. Kelsen's argument that effectiveness is a condition of validity (for norms subsidiary to the 
basic norm) is similarly unconvincing. See id. §§ 4c, 34g. It has been noted that the introduction of the 
effectiveness requirement in its various forms undercuts Kelsen's formal-logical methodology by the 
introduction of contingent facts. SeeR. MOORE, LEGAL NORMS AND LEGAL SCIENCE !96-99 {!978). 
50. H. KELSEN, supra note 39, at 48. A similar argument is made by Kelsen with regard to the 
status of a coercive order associated with a revolutionary insurgency. !d. § 34f. 
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the scope of legal science is difficult to discover. 5 1 
Hart 
Building upon Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart develops his theory that the 
distinctive feature of law is its combination of primary and secondary 
rules, the latter including (in particular) a "rule of recognition" analo-
gous in some ways to Kelsen's basic norm. 52 In doing so, he utilizes 
an important set of methodological categories: 
When a social group has certain rules of conduct, this fact affords 
an opportunity for many closely related yet different kinds of as-
sertion; for it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either 
merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a 
member of the group which accepts and uses them as guides to 
conduct. We may call these respectively the 'external' and the 'in-
ternal points of view'. Statements made from the external point of 
view may themselves be of different kinds. For the observer may, 
without accepting the rules himself, assert that the group accepts 
the rules, and thus may from outside refer to the way in which they 
are concerned with them from the internal point of view. But 
whatever the rules are, ... , we can if we choose occupy the posi-
tion of an observer who does not even refer in this way to the 
internal point of view of the group. 53 
Hart argues at length that a major defect in much of the earlier theory 
is its tendency to opt for the third delineated point of view, which Hart 
calls the "extreme external point of view", and is exemplified by at-
tempts to characterize "legal obligation" as referring to no more than 
a prediction of the behavior of officials. 54 Thus, Hart writes: 
5!. It may be argued that what we have before us is a problem no more difficult (in principle) 
than that of distinguishing the bald man from the non-bald man, a problem with which philosophers 
are particularly enamored. "Common sense", we are told, allows us to make the distinction, though 
obviously we are faced with a case of "continuous variation": there is no particular point at which one 
fewer hair makes a man bald. Similarly, these questions about habits of obedience (Austin), by and 
large effective coercive orders and public acceptance of basic norms (Kelsen) yield to our "common 
sense" in identifying "existing" legal orders and "objectively valid" legal orders. But surely this kind of 
resolution is particularly inappropriate to a theoretical perspective. We have seen the reasons already. 
A crucial part of jurisprudence must be to ask whether or not these "common sense" distinctions, if 
indeed they are such, are well-founded, and in the pursuit of an answer to such questions we would 
expect a legal theory to accept, at least tentatively, a perspective which recognizes the contingency and 
even variability of such matters as effectiveness and public acceptance. Cf P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, 
supra note 18; see also L. FULLER, supra note 36, at 198-200. 
52. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW Cbs. V-VI (1961). By a "primary rule" Hart means a 
rule directed to all individuals in the social group indicating how the individuals should or should not 
act in various circumstances. "Secondary rules" are rules about the primary rules, about how the latter 
can be authoritatively identified, changed, or applied to specific cases. Id. at 89-95. 
53. Id. at 86-87. 
54. Id. at 79-88. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897): 
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At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, 
legal or not, is likely to consist in a tension between those who, on 
the one hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the 
rules, and so see their own and other persons' behavior in terms of 
the rules, and those who, on the other hand, reject the rules and 
attend to them only from the external point of view as a sign of 
possible punishment. One of the difficulties facing any legal theory 
anxious to do justice to the complexity of the facts is to remember 
the presence of both these points of view and not to define one of 
them out of existence. Perhaps all our criticisms of the predictive 
theory of obligation may be best summarized as the accusation 
that this is what it does to the internal aspect of obligatory rules. 55 
17 
These are surely reasonable observations, especially as compo-
nents of a "strong"56 descriptive theory of developed legal systems. 
Indeed, Hart often refers to his theory as going to the "distinctive" 
features of modern municipal legal systems. 57 However, when it 
comes to delineating the scope of inquiry, by focusing so strongly on 
the rule-governed aspect of the behavior of the subjects of investigation 
- the actors in a legal system - Hart seems to lose sight of a fact 
which the earlier forms of positivism highlighted: among the most im-
portant of the principles governing the investigation itself is that our 
concept of law should help to illuminate our underlying normative de-
liberations. The pages of Hart's works are filled with examples of how 
this latter dimension is subsumed to the point of isolation from the 
concerns of descriptive jurisprudence. For example, in Hart's criti-
cism of a position commonly associated with the natural law tradition, 
to the effect that the positive enactments of the state are not "law" 
unless they satisfy certain requirements of justice or morality, Hart 
reasons from the following premise: 
If we are to make a reasoned choice between these concepts [the 
broad and narrow concepts of law associated, respectively, with a 
rejection or acceptance of the indicated position], it must be be-
cause one is superior to the other in the way in which it will assist 
our theoretical inquiries, or advance and clarify our moral deliber-
ations, or both. 58 · 
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
law." 
55. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 88. 
56. See supra note 18. 
57. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 16-17,50, 151. It is, of course, rather problematic that Hart 
differentiates "distinctive" from such modifiers as "common" or "typical". The former connotes a 
conspicuously unexplained normative relevance. This kind of linguistic ambiguity pervades Hart's the-
ory, leading commentators to question its descriptive (positivist) purity. See, e.g., Hill, Legal Validity 
and Legal Obligation, 80 YALE L.J. 47, 54-67 (1970). 
58. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 204-05. See also id. 208-09. 
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Hart's premise reflects the basic positivist duality, a radical separation 
of "theoretical" and "moral" investigations. The final "or both" in 
the quoted passage appears to recognize only that the choice at issue 
may involve both purposes, not that the two purposes are fundamen-
tally intertwined in the way previously described. 59 
It is Hart's failure to appreciate this connection which is at the 
root of his arguments for rejecting the "gunman" situation as an in-
stance of law. The details on this point are a bit involved, due to the 
convolutions of Hart's theory. Roughly, Hart argues that the gun-
man's command does not involve obligation on the part of his victim 
in the way that a law entails obligation on the part of the citizen. 
Though Hart repeatedly disavows giving a litmus test for the presence 
of law, he does say, in various forms, that where there is law, human 
conduct is made obligatory. 60 Hart suggests this, alternatively, as a 
fact about common language usage and as an assumption which, pre-
sumably, no one would doubt. 61 This sense of obligation is associated 
with the internal point of view toward a rule. 62 Yet, in developing 
"minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a 
legal system", Hart specifies only that some number of persons -
Hart calls them the "officials" of the system - must take the internal 
point of view.63 One is led, then, to realize that, notwithstanding 
Hart's original argument, the only feature in the gunman situation 
which precludes its being an instance of a legal system is something 
59. It is not necessary to examine here in detail the argument by Hart which appears to proceed 
from this premise: he indicates, somewhat cryptically, that there are advantages to employing the 
broader concept, for example in terms of citizens' resistance to iniquitous rules. !d. at 203-07. For an 
insightful criticism of Hart's argument, with which the present author only partly agrees, see Beyleveld 
& Brownsword, Law as a Moral Judgment vs. Law as the Rules of the Powerful, 28 AM. J. JURIS. 105-08 
(1983). See also infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
60. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, § V.2. 
61. !d. at 79-80, 212. 
62. !d. at 86-88. This association, it turns out, is extremely problematic. See Hill, supra note 57, 
at 58-75. Hill argues forcefully that Hart employs two different analyses of "obligation" in the legal 
context: one follows the positivist, value-free tradition and might appropriately be described in terms of 
a person's being "legally obliged"; the other follows the tradition of ordinary language philosophy and 
is better described in terms of "legal obligation". The former derives its force from legal validity, while 
the latter derives its force from principles of justice and morality. In other words, Hill argues for a 
distinction between that which has legal validity and that which entails legal obligation, pointing out 
that Hart simply assumes the coincidence of these notions. Compare the classical natural law view as 
interpreted by J. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 26. Even if we accept Hill's invitation to make this distinc-
tion, it is doubtful that Hart's theory gives even an adequate account of legal validity. Cf R. DwoR-
KIN, supra note 19, Chs. 2-3. 
63. H. L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 113-14. There is, of course, a threat of circularity in using the 
notion of "official" in marking off legal systems from other social phenomena. See Ladenson, supra 
note 32, at 157-59. Elsewhere, Hart seems to try to avoid circularity by characterizing "officials" as 
simply "experts" with regard to the rule-system under consideration. H. L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 
59. 
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COERCION AND lLJEGAiL THEORY 19 
about the attitude of the gunman, not the absence of a sense of obliga-
tion iri his victim or in the observer of the situation, nor the absence of 
"genuine" obligation (i.e. from a universal but internal point of view). 
Apparently, if the~e were two gunmen, wh? agreed in advance on the 
rules by which theli robbery would be earned out and who used those 
rules to criticize each other's conduct, then we would have a legal sys-
tem. Indeed, behavior can be rule-governed even when the only per-
son engaging in the criticism of deviations is the deviant himself. So if, 
for example, the gunman is willing to say to himself, "You idiot, that's 
not the way to rob someone!" -again we have a legal system. Hart's 
barricade agaifiSt the gunman case crumbles before our eyes, all the 
faster once we generalize "rules" to "norms", and admit it to be suffi-
cient if the gunman's actions are purposive, which they typically are. 64 
It should be mentioned that Hart specifies a second condition for 
the existence of a legal system: the primary rules of behavior must be 
"generally obeyed".65 This requirement suffers from the same defect 
as the similar requirements discussed in connection with Austin and 
Kelsen, and we are given no reason for such a requirement, at least no 
reason besides common usage or perhaps some unspecified "theoreti-
64. A similar criticism has been directed at Hart's distinction (H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 
89-95) betweerr the "pre-legal" regime- a (hypothetical) society which lacks recognized meta-rules for 
identifying, changing, and adjudicating disputes concerning the primary rules of behavior - and the 
genuinely "legal" system: 
Hart may be right in regarding a certain degree of sophistication as essential to a regime's 
being a proper legal system, but a strong case could be put forward the other way for 
regarding primitive legal systems as genuinely legal and not merely pre-legal. In either case 
it is important not to allow the specific differences between the pre-legal regime and the 
fully developed legal system to obscure their generic similarities. Legal and pre-legal re-
gimes differ in sophistication, but both have the hallmark of enforceability which distin-
guishes them from systems of morality and social custom, and both share with morality, 
but not etiquette, a high degree of seriousness. Hart's emphasis is different. He stresses the 
difference between a fully developed legal system and a pre-legal regime. The important 
thing, according to him, about a legal system is that it has certain meta-rules, notably a rule 
of recognition, and that the system as a whole is enforced. The effect of this emphasis is to 
play down the connection between a fully developed legal system and its roots in a pre-legal 
regime and other systems of social control, and to make law appear a much more abstract 
and autonomous discipline than it really is. 
Lucas, The Phenomenon of Law, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. 
HART 91 (P. Hacker & J. Raz ed. 1977). 
65. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 113-14. Actually, the s<tme qualifier ("generally") would 
have to be applied by Hart to the other minimum condition, the taking of an internal point of view by 
the officials (experts) of the system. Thus, that condition would be (to reword Hart) that the system's 
"rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication 
must be [generally] accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials." Cf id. at 
113. This analytical qualifier is necessitated by Hart's focus upon the existence of social rules (primary 
and secondary) as the primary fact of legal reality and the consequent necessity of specifying when such 
rules exist. The conser;ative implications of Hart's approach are displayed in Dworkin's ctiticism of 
Hart. R. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 48-58. Dworkin points out, for example, how perfectly sensible 
moral discourse may include appeal to a rule which is not currently and widely followed. 
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cal" purpose. 66 It is true that such a reason might be brought forward. 
Indeed, Hart's emphasis upon reciprocity as a justification for coercing 
deviants who accept benefits but not burdens (of actions to which they 
themselves do not consent) might be the basis of a suggestion for the 
normative relevance of "generally obeyed" primary rules. 67 But Hart 
does not advance this argument, whatever its merits. His socio-lin-
guistic coherence approach to the problem of the nature of law and 
legal systems is pursued first; his argument about reciprocity is only 
advanced later, as a matter apparently independent of the earlier argu-
ment. In any case, aside from the problems of making more precise 
the notion of "generally obeyed", the resolution of such a controver-
sial normative question, at the very core of social philosophy, 68 should 
not be presumed in setting forth a supposedly neutral characterization 
of law and legal systems. 
Positivism Reconsidered 
If we were to be uncharitable, we would accuse the positivists of 
premising their theories, in more and less subtle ways, upon a defense 
of the dominant coercive order by allowing the rhetorical power of the 
term "law" to that order alone. 69 This would be understandable in 
light of the intellectual's typically vested interest in "the Establish-
ment". It might seem particularly consistent with that branch of legal 
positivism, exemplified by Kelsen, which reflects extreme skepticism 
about the possibility of a rational morality and which might be ex-
66. Cf. H.L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 100-01 (queries supplied): 
[A] general disregard for the rules of the system ... may be so complete in character and 
so protracted that we should [?] say [?], in the case of a new system, that it had never 
established itself as the [?]legal system of a given group, or, in the case of a once-established 
system, that it had ceased to be the [?]legal system of the group. In either case, the normal 
context or background for making any internal statement in terms of the rules of the system 
is absent. In such cases it would be generally pointless either to assess the rights and duties 
of particular persons by reference to the primary rules of a system or to assess the validity 
of any of its rules by reference to its rules of recognition. 
Just when and why it would be "generally pointless" is not adequately explained, nor is the definitional 
significance of such a contingent fact about an obviously variable efficacy. 
67. H. L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 193. See also Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. 
REV. 185 (1955); Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY (S. 
Hooked. 1964). 
68. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 90 et seq. (1974); cf. Greenawalt, Prom-
ise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind Us to the Law, 18:4 GA. L. REv. 727, 754-69 (1984). 
69. See, e.g., the similar suggestion made in M. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 55 (1973). 
This problem of underinclusiveness seems to be just the opposite of the overinclusiveness which natural 
lawyers have found to be a defect of positivism. The classic case of the latter is the positivist claim that 
the Nazi rule constituted a legal system. See the Hart-Fuller debate, cited infra notes 107-08. For a 
more contemporary version of the anti-positivist criticism, see J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER Ch. II (1978). How these seemingly contradictory criticisms can be 
compatible will become evident in the following discussion. 
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pected to oppose any clai~ of.the relevance of normative conc~rns t.o 
descriptive theory.70 But m fa1rness to Kelsen, we must recogmze h1s 
emphasis upon the importance of the demystification of the state by its 
identification as a coercive social order, the justice of which is open to 
question. 71 Conversely, such a motivation might seem inconsistent 
with one of the fundamental premises of the utilitarian legal positivism 
exemplified by Austin: the necessity of distinguishing law as it is from 
law as it ought to be, in order to make possible the moral (utilitarian) 
criticism of law. 72 Yet these motivations are not necessarily inconsis-
tent: one can understand the desire of utilitarian (and other) critics to 
have a position from which to pressure the dominant coercive forces in 
the direction of their proposed reforms without wanting to undermine 
general obedience to law, including especially that which they are try-
. t t 73 mg o crea e. 
More charitably, perhaps, we could attribute the indicated at-
tempts at definitional fiat to the influence of positivism as a general 
scientific orientation, one which emphasizes predictivism even with re-
gard to social science methodology. Aside from the general influence 
of science and its methodology on modern social thought, it is worth 
noting that legal theorists, especially those in the Anglo-American 
world, are commonly very familiar with and interested in the training 
and functioning of the legal profession. A considerable amount of ef-
fort by many "plain men" and their attorneys goes into trying to pre-
dict and control the impact of law on their lives. The focus tends to be 
upon tactical issues which largely take the panoply of laws as given. 
There is good reason to question the desirability of such a predomi-
nantly instrumentalist conception of legal cognition among the prac-
ticing bar, 74 although in some cases it may be an unavoidable, 
defensive reaction to a significant decline in the perceived justness of 
the legal system as a whole. When attorneys function in the service of 
the state there is the even more worrisome tendency to bring the dis-
passionate, even Machiavellian, service of the client's "interests" to 
70. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 12-14. 
71. See supra note 43. 
72. D. RICHARDS, supra note 21, at 14-16. 
73. This explanation fits well with Friedrich Hayek's interpretation of legal positivism as a part 
of, or at least readily embraced by, a broader nineteenth and early twentieth century movement to 
undermine the "Rule of Law" - i.e., the set of social restraints upon governmental power. These 
social restraints (which Hayek calls "meta-legal"), once deprived of legal authority by the positivists' 
insistence upon pedigree for a valid law (see supra note 29) could be effectively ignored in the effort to 
launch the Welfare State. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY Ch. 16 (1960). Cf M. 
KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 18, Ch. 5. 
74. For a good discussion, see L. FULLER, "The Needs of American Legal Philosophy," supra 
note 21, at 249-60. 
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the tactical design of statutes and legal institutions to achieve the goals 
of "social policy". 75 And the intensity and insularity of legal educa-
tion cannot but strongly affect those legal theorists who turn to con-
sider broader questions. 76 The result can be distortion, as exemplified 
by the legal realist movement. 77 
Hart, we have seen, eschews the behaviorist "extreme external 
point of view", presumably in favor of a "theoretical" approach which 
entails a non-extreme external point of view.78 But it is not clear 
whether he does so in the spirit of those critics of positivism in social 
science who emphasize the importance of a realist understanding (Ver-
stehen) with regard to social phenomena, 19 or whether he does so 
merely as a recognition of superior technique in the construction of 
social theory within the predictivist/positivist model. 80 In any event, 
positivist theorists who take prediction (and the associated power of 
control) as the success criterion for a descriptive or scientific theory of 
law could harbor the unstated premise that (qualitatively? signifi-
cantly?) different predictive models are appropriate, useful, efficient, 
etc., for such social phenomena as criminal gangs, on the one hand, 
and modern bureaucratic states on the other- the term "law" being 
applied (for some reason) only to the latter. The premise seems ques-
tionable on its face, given the history of such states, but much more 
could be said on the matter. 81 Suffice it here to say that it is questiona-
ble whether superior predictions can be identified as consequences of 
accepting these positivist views. Certainly, the relevance of such a dis-
tinction to practical concerns - aside from the prudential importance 
75. SeeR. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 2-6. See also Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence 
and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433, 442-44 (1978), in which Summers 
discusses the role of social science in the dominant "pragmatic instrumentalism" of American law and 
contrasts Lon Fuller's views on the matter. 
76. The distortions of legal theory which tend to arise from the training of professional advocates 
and representatives have been noted by H. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 12, at 16, and by J. FINNIS, 
supra note 15, at 279-80. It is worth noting, for example, that Holmes's much-criticized predictivist 
theory of law (supra note 54) was presented in a dedication address at a law school and was directed to 
a professional audience. 
77. The so-called "legal realists" were members of a complex school of thought which, in its quest 
to demystify the law and its judges, is sometimes thought to have amplified the prediction of the behav-
ior of officials into a comprehensi~e jurisprudence within the positivist tradition. See R. SUMMERS, 
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982); for a more sympathetic analysis, see W. 
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). 
78. See Hill, supra note 57, at 54-58, esp. 57 n.45. 
79. See, e.g., P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 
(1958); A.R. LOUCH, EXPLANATION AND HUMAN ACTION (1966). 
80. See, e.g., R. RUDNER, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 4-5, Ch. 4 (1966). This ambiguity 
concerning Hart is mirrored in that concerning his analysis of legal obligation. See supra note 62. 
81. See the works cited infra note 145. See also G. POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN 
STATE (1978). 
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of paying special attentio~ to the behavior ?f ~h.e str?nges~ bully in 
towri _is unestablished. Moreover, the predlctlvist onentat10n as the 
basis of any social science needs serious critical attention. 82 
Perhaps the simplest way to avoid the import of the queries devel-
oped here w:ould .be to accep~ th~ positivist's. dist~ncti?ns as nothing 
more than discretiOnary exerctses m the selectiOn 01 soctal phenomena 
to investigate. Thus, for example, picking coercive orders "by a.nd 
large effective" would be no more or less defensible than the biologist's 
picking, say, "particularly large" dogs to study. We would want to 
know more precisely what the biologist considers "particularly large", 
but otherwise we would be inclined, in the spirit of free inquiry, t:..: 
accept the biologist's choice. Yet we would not believe there to be any 
normative (or other!) significance to the choice- unless, for example, 
we were in substantial accord with W.C. Fields on the worth of small 
dogs. Similarly, the positivists may be viewed as saying: we want to 
study this kind of social phenomenon, and we will call it law simply 
because of the facial similarity to ordinary language usage. But noth~ 
ing of a prescriptive character then follows- certainly not, for exam~ 
ple, any right to rule or obligation (prima facie or all things 
considered) to obey the law. 83 For at this point we have slipped into a 
pure conventionalism with regard to the specification of scope of in-
quiry, looking at most to some form of investigational convenience as 
a criterion of selection. 84 
B. The Natural Law Tradition 
The natural law tradition encompasses a wide range of theories, 
from the classical theories of the Greek philosophers, to the theologi-
cally based theories of the Middle Ages, to the natural rights theories 
of the Enlightenment, and on to the work of several contemporary 
82. Consider, e.g., H. Marcuse, Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber, in 
NEGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CRITICAL THEORY 223-24 (1968): 
Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination (of nature and 
men) - methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating control. Specific purposes and inter-
ests of domination are not foisted upon technology "subsequently" and from the outside; 
they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is al•Nays a histori-
cal-social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with 
men and things. 
See generally UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY (F. Dallmayr & T. McCarthy ed. 1977); R. 
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976). 
83. The extent to which positivists endorse such notions is often difficult to determine. As for 
Austin, see supra note 30, at 126-27; re Hart, see infra note 107 and accompanying text. See also J. 
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, Part IV (1979), and supra note 32. 
84. Compare the similar treatment of conventionalism in M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 8, 
18-20 ( 1975). Note also the differences between such conventionalism and the "conceptual pragma-
tism" employed here. See supra note 12 and accompanying text 
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legal philosophers. 85 It is difficult, therefore, to identify a unifying 
theme. One to which reference is commonly made is the claim that 
there exist rules or principles for the governance of human affairs 
which are not of the deliberate making of any human lawgiver. These 
rules or principles may be found in divine origin or derived from val-
ues inherent in the nature of man, but such theories "agree that all 
positive law derives its validity from some rules that have not in this 
sense been made by men but which can be 'found' and that these rules 
provide both the criterion for the justice of positive laws and the 
ground for men's obedience to it. " 86 
In this subsection we will consider the relevant implications of the 
natural law approach for the specification of the scope of inquiry in 
jurisprudence. We will take as our sample the theories of Lon Fuller 
and John Finnis, two modern scholars identified with this tradition 
who have written extensively on its implications for descriptive legal 
theory. 
Fuller 
Fuller argues for a broadly inclusive concept of law as the "enter-
prise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules. " 87 He 
insists that positivism, by focusing exclusively on the rules which are 
the product of this process, fails to attend to law as an ongoing purpo-
sive activity. 88 In the course of making his argument, Fuller is gener-
ally more explicit about the methodological issues which we have 
considered, no doubt partly because of his concern about the under-
pinnings of positivism as a general philosophical orientation. 89 Thus, 
Fuller rejects behaviorism (the extreme external point of view) but ap-
pears to remain within a basically scientific perspective. 9° For exam-
ple, he argues for the inclusion within the ambit of law of various 
human activities, not commonly thought of as legal, but which also 
exemplify the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the govern-
ance of rules: for example, the development of rules governing the in-
ternal affairs of non-state institutions like churches, clubs, and trade 
85. See generally A.P. o'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW (1951). 
86. F. HAYEK, supra note 73, at 237. 
87. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96 (rev. ed. 1969). 
88. Id. Ch. 5, e.g., at 193. 
89. I d. at 241-42. In particular, Fuller compares his enterprise theory of law with the theorizing 
of philosophers and sociologists of science, suggesting that the best way to look at law or science is as an 
activity. Id. at 118-22. 
90. Id. at IBn, 141, 145-51, 162-67. These passages suggest that Fuller would be appropriately 
considered within the Verstehen tradition of social science methodology. See infra notes 79-82 and 
accompanying text. 
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associations. His defense of this inclusion primarily consists of argu-
ing that: 
. a sociologist or philosopher interested primarily in the law of 
the state, might study the rules, institutions, and problems of this 
body of parietal law for the insight he might thus obtain into the 
processes of law generally. 91 
It is, then, precisely because the law is a purposeful enterprise that 
it displays structural constancies which the legal theorist can dis-
cover and treat as uniformities in the factually given.92 
In so arguing, Fuller explicitly displays a healthy refusal to worship at 
the idol of ordinary language. 93 Moreover, he provides us with a con-
nection, of the sort called for in this paper, between the normative 
concerns of the investigator and the criteria of success of the investiga-
tion. Namely, Fuller posits the undeniably legitimate purpose of de-
veloping a jurisprudence to "analyze the fundamental problems that 
must be solved in creating and administering a system of legal 
rules."94 This purpose is the organizing principle behind Fuller's "in-
ternal morality of law" -the set of normative principles which can be 
discovered as implicit in, and thereby limiting the effective use of, the 
different forms of social ordering, such as legislation, adjudication, 
contract, and elections. 95 
We may now inquire why this limited normative concern, which 
his critics have attacked as a concern for mere effi.cacy,96 should ex-
haust the quest for the proper scope of inquiry. As Fuller is prompt to 
point out, "the purpose [he has] attributed to the institution of law is a 
modest and sober one, that of subjecting human conduct to the gui-
dance and control of general rules. "97 Assuming, however, that such 
modesty with regard to a generic institutional purpose of law is appro-
priate, there is no reason to translate this limitation directly to the 
study of law. In that context, the more general purpose includes, to 
paraphrase, the "analysis of fundamental problems that must be 
solved in creating and administering a just system oflegal rules". That 
in turn requires us (also) to focus attention upon the substantive aims 
of legal rules and the coercive sanctions which are typically associated 
with them. 
91. L. FULLER, supra note 87, at 125. 
92. !d. at 151. 
93. !d. at 122, 129, 195-96, 199, 207. 
94. !d. at 122. 
95. ld. Ch. II. See a/soL. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER (K. Winston ed. 1981). 
96. L. FULLER supra note 87, at 2.00 et seq. 
97. !d. at 146. 
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This step Fuller refuses to take. 98 He rejects coercion as "a dis-
tinguishing mark" oflaw.99 If this rejection were taken simply to be a 
denial of the necessity of coercion as a component of any phenomenon 
upon which jurisprudence is to focus, one could easily agree, in view of 
Fuller's legitimate concern for the comparative study of institutions 
whose rules are not backed by (direct) coercive sanctions. But Fuller's 
argument appears to be much stronger, for he denies that the presence 
of such coercion is sufficient to bring the matter within the scope of 
inquiry. This aspect of Fuller's approach is strikingly incongruous 
with his expressed interest in comparative study. If there is a moral 
and empirical continuity worthy of study between the social processes 
of a rule-governed church organization and those of the law of the 
state, why js there not a similar continuity - resulting in a similarly 
broad inclusiveness - between reasonably just law of the state and 
acts of confiscation behind the facade of "published rules and robed 
judges"? 100 
Fuller's apparent response to this question is not convincing. He 
observes factors which quite reasonably suggest an identification of 
law with the use of coercion, but argues that these factors fall short of 
a justification for such identification: 
In the first place, given the facts of human nature, it is perfectly 
obvious that a system of legal rules may lose its efficacy if it per-
mits itself to be challenged by lawless violence. Sometimes vio-
lence can only be restrained by violence. Hence it is quite 
predictable that there must normally be in society some mecha-
nism ready to apply force in support of law in case it is needed. 
But this in no sense justifies treating the use or potential use of 
force as the identifying characteristic of law. Modern science de-
pends heavily upon the use of measuring and testing apparatus; 
without such apparatus it could not have achieved what it has. 
But no one would conclude on this account that science should be 
defined as the use of apparatus for measuring and testing. So it is 
with law. What law must foreseeably do to achieve its aims is 
something quite different from law itself. 101 
But could not the same argument be made about all manner of purpo-
sive human activity which could not possibly be within our scope of 
inquiry? Could artistry be efficacious if it "permits" itself to be chal-
lenged by "lawless" violence? Is it not then predictable that there 
98. What Fuller does do is to explore the ways in which the normative principles inherent in the 
forms of legal ordering constrain the substantive aims attainable through law. E.g., id. Ch. IV. 
99. !d. at !08. 
100. Paraphrasing from id. at !09. 
10!. !d. at !08. 
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must normally be in society some mechanism ready to apply force in 
support of artistry? ~i{et it is law, not artistry, which provides this 
0 JO? 
mechamsm. -
There is, thus, a peculiar tendency in Fuller's 'Hork to focus on 
the noble ideal of law and to ignore its coercive reality. Kt is as if the 
latter side of law were shunted aside to avoid contaminating the for-
mer. raJ Indeed, this is manifest in the argument vvith vvhich Fuller 
continues: 
Let us test this identification with a hypothetical case. A nation 
admits foreign traders within its borders only on condition that 
they deposit a substantial sum of money in the national bank guar-
anteeing their observance of a body of law specially applicable to 
their activities. This body of law is administered with integrity 
and, in case of dispute, is interpreted and applied by special courts. 
If an infraction is established the state pursuant to court order le-
vies a fine in the form of a deduction from the trader's deposit. ·No 
force, but a mere bookkeeping operation, is required to accomplish 
this deduction; no force is available to the trader that could pre-
vent it. Surely it would be perverse to deny the term "law" to such 
a system merely because it had no occasion to use force or tht 
threat of force to effectuate its requirements. 104 
This rather bizarre failure to recognize the significance of the coercion 
directly employed in conditioning the foreign trader's ability to come 
within the national boundaries on the deposit- i.e. threatening c.or:::-
cive acts in the event the foreigner attempts to trade ;;;vithout n1.aking 
it 105 - confirms that Fuller has a separate normative criterion of :me> 
!02. Compare Roberto Unger's remark, drawing on the work of Talcott Parsons: 
Many things besides law may fit into the category of normative order; for example, a soci-
ety's religion and art. To the extent that law can be differentiated from these other aspects 
of normative order, it is distinguished by its primary emphasis on externally observable 
behavior and on the use of secular sanctions to penalize or redress deviant con duet. 
R. UNGER, supra note 82, at 57. My point here is not to deny that reflections on the purpose of 
institutions can sometimes be used to isolate an "essence" thereof, but rather to point out that in the 
analytical process of that isolation for legal institutions, the instrumentality of coercion is a defining 
consideration. Any "essence" of law, if one can be identified, must focus upon the problems of coercive 
interaction among people. 
103. Consider L. FULLER, supra note 87, at 156: 
We [colonial Americans] were f01tunate that we had learned from our British teachers 
something of the need for law and for preserving its integrity and force. Much of the world 
today yearns for justice without having undergone a similar tutelage. There was never a 
time that could reveal more plainly the vacuity of the view that law simply expresses a 
datum of legitimated social power. Nor was there ever a time when it was more dangerous 
to take that view seriously. 
!04. I d. at !09. 
105. It should be clear that Fuller's argument and the present criticism thereof are distinct from 
controversies concerning the individuation of laws, i.e. the determination of which and how much legal 
material makes up one law. See J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM Ch. IV (1980). 
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cess in specifying his notion of law. This criterion does not appear on 
the face of the formula, "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct 
to the governance of rules", nor in an untortured interpretation of his 
underlying normative concern about the fundamental problems that 
must be solved in creating and administering a system of rules. 106 
In fact, there is an underlying requirement that the notion of law 
entail a moral obligation of fidelity thereto, an obligation which Fuller 
takes as axiomatic. It is this requirement which leads Fuller to balk at 
the inclusion of the gunman within the domain of legal phenomena. 
And it is striking that Fuller, so at odds with the positivists for their 
more subtle attempts, nevertheless similarly attempts. to delimit the 
scope of inquiry by a kind of definitional fiat. Fuller's logic in this 
regard can be most easily seen in his earlier debate with Hart in the 
Harvard Law Review. There, Fuller observes that Hart, while denying 
any necessary connection between law as it is and law as it ought to be, 
nevertheless accepts the prima facie moral duty of "fidelity" to law. 107 
Fuller's reaction to this oddity is to assert the necessary connection 
rather than to give up the obligation. 108 While that is a conceivable 
remedy for the inconsistency apparent in Hart's position, it is obvi-
ously not the only one. 109 Fuller argues as though it were. 
We may suggest a resolution of this conflict which, though it 
might not be entirely to Fuller's liking, is nonetheless a happy one. It 
is based once more upon the distinction between definition and theory, 
or, as we have developed it here, between the scope of the inquiry and 
the theoretical formulations therein. We may take Fuller's liberalizing 
extensions to be related to scope of inquiry, and his delimitations as 
related to his theoretical formulation based upon aspirations toward 
an "ideal" form. If one takes such an approach, Fuller's rejection of 
coercive interaction as a type of legal phenomenon falls away. More-
over, within the domain of inquiry legal phenomena may more easily 
be understood as manifesting the variable "legality" (internal moral-
ity) which Fuller emphasizes. 110 Of course, that does not eliminate the 
106. Fuller characterizes this "procedural" natural law as an elaboration of seventeenth century 
English law of due process, distinguishing its concerns from issues of substantive justice. L. FULLER, 
supra note 87, at 96 et seq. 
107. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). 
This is a problem which has afflicted legal positivists generally. See SOCIETY, LAw AND MoRALITY 
435-37 (F. Olafson ed. 1961). It should be noted that Hart's position on this matter seems to have 
changed. See Lyons, supra note I, at 730-33. 
108. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law- A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 
(1958). 
109. See Hill's resolution of Hart's confusions, supra note 57. 
110. L. FULLER, supra note 87, at 122-23, 198-200. Such variable legality can be important in a 
variety of ways, not the least of which is as a component of the determination of the existence of an 
obligation to obey a given rule of law. There is no reason to identify such a determination with the 
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fundamental difference of opinion between him and the positivists at 
the level of theory construction. 111 Perhaps the extent to which those 
persons taking an internal point. ~f .vie"'_' have or oug~t to have ~ posi-
tivist view of law or the non-pos1t1v1st v1ew of law whiCh Fuller mstan-
tiates is itself a matter for empirical and normative inquiry into the 
emergence and decay of two (perhaps among many) ideal types, in this 
case types of legal ideologies. 112 If so, we may take Fuller's argument 
as one to the effect that his view of law is a superior working concep-
tion, especially for those with the internal point of view, because of the 
attention it focuses upon certain aspirational ideals. 113 
Before leaving our discussion of Fuller, and notwithstanding the 
reconciliatory suggestions just made, it will be helpful to illustrate how 
Fuller's minimization of the significance of coercion leads to analytical 
peculiarities suggestive of the decisional program criticized in the in-
troduction of this paper. 114 In discussing the relation of morality and 
law, Fuller considers the example of gambling, indicating the mode of 
analysis that a "hypothetical moral legislator" would employ in decid-
ing whether or not gambling should be condemned as immoral, in the 
sense of its constituting a breach of a moral duty. 115 After developing 
this analytical approach, involving primarily considerations of the 
harmfulness of gambling to oneself and others, Fuller continues: 
How is such a moral judgment related to the question of whether 
gambling ought to be prohibited by law? The answer is, very di-
J:"ectly. Our hypothetical legislator of morals could shift his mle to 
that of lawmaker without any drastic change in his methods of 
judgment. As a lawmaker he will face certain questions that as a 
moralist he could conveniently leave to casuistry. He will have to 
decide what to do about games of skill or games in which the out-
come is determined partly by skill and partly by chance. As a stat-
utory draftsman he will confront the difficulty of distinguishing 
between gambling for small stakes as an innocent amusement and 
determination of whether "iaw" or "legal system" exists, although Fuller occassionally seems to be 
suggesting identity. See, e.g., id. at 39-41. Also, in making his arguments that substantial failure along 
some of the dimensions of internal morality can result in no law at all, Fuller identifies "law" and "legal 
system" and conf!ates the existence of an enterprise to make rules with the rules which the enterprise is 
attempting to make. Id. at 41, 122, 197-200. Perhaps it is more reasonable to reserve the concept of 
a legal system" to refer to a successful enterprise, though there would be serious problems in identifying 
the criteria of "success" in this context, as the preceding discussion of positivist views has 
demonstrated. 
11 1. See Fulier's discussion of the "ideal types" constituted by the positivist "managerial theory 
of law" and his own "intendments" or "reciprocity" theory of law. I d. at 207 et seq. 
112. See Nonet, The Legitimation of Purposive Decisions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1980). 
113. Fuller's arguments often suggest such an interpretation. See. e.g., Fuller, supra note 108, at 
631-32, 637. 
114. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
115. L. FULLER, supra note 87, at 5-9. 
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gambling in its more desperate and harmful forms. If no formula 
comes readily to hand for this purpose, he may be tempted to draft 
his statute so as to include every kind of gambling, leaving it to the 
prosecutor to distinguish the innocent from the truly harmful. 
Before embracing this expedient, often described euphemistically 
as "selective enforcement," our moralist turned lawmaker will 
have to reflect on the dangerous consequences that would attend a 
widened application of that principle, already a pervasive part of 
the actual machinery of law enforcement. Many other considera-
tions of this nature he would have to take into account in drafting 
and proposing his statute. But at no point would there be any 
sharp break with the methods he followed in deciding whether to 
condemn gambling as immoral. 116 
What is peculiar about this passage is that there is no clue as to why 
the hypothetical lawmaker must face these "certain questions" which 
the moralist could avoid. It seems clear that the coercive sanction is 
the source of the additional concern, but it is hard to find this in 
Fuller's explanation. 117 On the whole, Fuller suggests no serious dis-
continuity between the "legislative" considerations of (non-legal) 
moral duty and those of legal duty. This can easily be associated with 
a view that any act constituting a breach of a moral duty is appropri-
ately proscribed by law, aside from certain, seemingly incidental mat-
ters c("casuistry") concerrung the fair administration of the 
proscription. 118 
Finn is 
The final theorist to be considered is John Finnis, who has at-
tempted to revitalize and improve the classical natural law of Aristotle 
116. Id. at 7-8. 
117. One might be tempted to say that there are obvious considerations of constitutional law, or 
its analogues in the jurisprudence of non-constitutional states, which constrain the lawmaker differen-
tially. But that, of course, only pushes the inquiry back a step, requiring us to explain the reason(s) for 
the constitutional concerns. 
118. In fairness to Fuller, it should be pointed out that another part of his theory illustrates his 
concern about moralistic authoritarianism and provides something of a barrier thereto. Indeed, the 
main thrust of the gambling example is to illustrate the difference between "the morality of aspiration" 
(based upon the effort to live fully and well) and "the morality of duty" (based upon the effort to limit 
one's actions in the minimal ways necessary for communal life). For Fuller, the former bears a close 
affinity to the substantive aims of law, the latter to the "internal morality of law". L. FULLER, supra 
note 87, Chs. 1-11. If Fuller's only point is that the moral considerations concerning the substantive 
aims of law are properly much more like those of the morality of duty than those of the morality of 
aspiration, then perhaps the present criticism is misdirected. Moreover, since Fuller deplores much of 
the moral escalation by which moral aspirations become moral duties (id. at 10), it is clear that his 
general inclination is to keep the category of moral duties relatively small and thereby restrict the 
category of candidates for the duties of citizens under substantive law. See also id. at 132-33, Ch. IV; 
Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra note 21, at 
67. 
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and Aquinas. 119 Finnis ~isplays a highly de.ve~oped appreciation of 
·the interaction of normatiVe theory and descnptlVe theory. Although 
there are serious points of disagreement between Finnis and the pres-
ent author on the requirements of "practical reasonableness" (the 
foundation of natural law), Finnis's approach to the relevance of such 
a normative theory to descriptive theory is in substantial accord with 
that employed here. As we shall see, however, Finnis does not take his 
approach quite far enough, at least not explicitly. 
In reviewing the trend of jurisprudence in this area, Finnis recog-
nizes the progressively greater incorporation of attention to the practi-
cal point of legal institutions into the theoretical constructs of modern 
jurists, including in particular Austin, Kelsen, Hart, and Fuller. 120 He 
explains this natural impetus by way of a general principle, drawn 
from Aristotle and Weber, for descriptive analysis of social phenom-
ena: description can best proceed by way of comparison of extant legal 
practices, conceptions, and institutions with the "central case" (or "fo-
cal meaning") thereof, i.e. the legal conceptions and institutions hypo-
thetically developed by the exercise of practical reasonableness.'2 1 His 
definition of law, 122 evolving over several chapters of his book, consti-
tutes what he claims to be such a central case, "not as an approxima-
tion of the term 'law' in a univocal sense that would exclude from the 
reference of the term anything that failed to have all the characteristics 
(and to their full extent) as the central case." 123 Contrasts with this 
central case are not properly employed "to banish the other noncen-
119. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
120. /d. § 1.2. It should be remembered that the term "practical" is used by Finnis, as by the 
present author, in the sense of "with a view to decision and action", not in the sense of "workable" or 
"efficient". /d. at 12. 
121. /d. at§§ L3-L4. For reasons which are not entirely clear, Finnis restricts the viewpoint from 
which to hypothetically elaborate his conception to that "in which legal obligation is treated as at least 
presumptively a moral obligation". /d. at 14. This restriction may be unnecessary. See Beyleveld & 
Brownsword, supra note 59, at 115-17. 
122. The full characterization is as follows: 
[T]he term 'law' has been used with a focal meaning so as to refer primarily to rules made, 
in accordance with regulative legal rules, by a determinate and effective authority (itself 
identified and, standardly, constituted as an institution by legal rules) for a 'complete' com-
munity, and buttressed by sanctio~s in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of adju-
dicative institutions, this ensemble of rules and institutions being directed to reasonably 
resolving any of the community's co-ordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regu-
lating, or overriding co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or sources of 
norms) for the common good of that community, according to a manner and form itself 
adapted to that common good by features of specificity, minimization of arbitrariness, and 
maintenance of a quality of reciprocity between the subjects of the law both amongst them-
selves and in their relations with the lawful authorities. 
J. FINNIS, supra note 119, at 276-77. As already mentioned, I have some serious problems with the 
details of this characterization, in particular as to the supposedly rational nature of the need for "com-
plete community". See id. § VI.6. Discussion of these problems must await another occasion. 
123. /d. at 277. 
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tral cases to some other discipline." 124 Finnis explains: 
There is thus a movement to and fro between, on the one hand, 
assessments of human good and of its practical requirements, and 
on the other hand, explanatory descriptions (using all appropriate 
historical, experimental, and statistical techniques to trace all rele-
vant causal interrelationships) of the human context in which 
human well-being is variously realized and variously ruined. . . . 
There is thus a mutual though not quite symmetrical interdepen-
dence between the project of describing human affairs by way of 
theory and the project of evaluating human options with a view, at 
least remotely, to acting reasonably and well. The evaluations are 
in no way deduced from the descriptions; but one whose knowl-
edge of the facts of the human situation is very limited is unlikely 
to judge well in discerning the practical implications of the basic 
values. Equally, the descriptions are not deduced from the evalua-
tions; but without the evaluations one cannot determine what de-
scriptions are really illuminating and significant. 125 
Indeed, unless some such normative theory is developed, Finnis 
argues: 
analytical jurisprudence in particular and (at least the major part 
of) all the social sciences in general can have no critically justified 
criteria for the formation of general concepts, and must be content 
to be no more than manifestations of the various concepts peculiar 
to particular peoples and/or to the particular theorists who con-
cern themselves with those people. 126 
This much seems reasonable and is at least consistent with the 
approach taken here. 127 Moreover, it purports to resolve the tension 
between Fuller and the positivists which we left incompletely resolved 
in our earlier discussion: 128 Finnis here seems to argue- rather con-
vincingly- that practically relevant, and hence adequate, descriptive 
theory construction must proceed in conjunction with an increasingly 
refined elaboration of the ideal manifestation of law, precisely in the 
sense that the better one's development of such an ideal conception of 
law, the more informative can be one's description of existing legal 
124. !d. at 278. 
125. !d. at 17, 19. 
126. !d. at 18. 
127. Finnis's argument is not without its ambiguities. His reliance upon Weber, in particular, is 
confusing in that Weber held that his "ideal type", though formed inevitably under the influence of a 
theorist's perceptions of importance, does not entail a moral judgment that it is normatively ideal. See 
Gavison, Natural Law, Positivism, and the Limits of Jurisprudence: A Modern Round (Book Review), 
191 YALE L.J. 1250, 1264-70 (1982). 
128. See supra text accompanying notes I I 1-13. 
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129 
systems. 
Nevertheless, at least one crucial modification is necessary. lit 
must at some point be specified for which social phenomena one is 
developing a central case to use as a standard for comparison. One 
needs, in other words, a specification of the scope of inquiry. The ar-
gument presented here is that this specification should be based not 
simply upon the unfocused usages of ordinary language but upon a 
more critical reflection. It is itself a matter for the resonant "move-
ment to and fro" of normative and descriptive theory. Finnis has little 
to say about this, but he does recognize the "main features" of a legal 
order out of which to construct the focal meaning: 
So it is that legal order has two broad characteristics, two charac-
teristic modes of operation, two poles about which jurisprudence 
and 'definitions of law' tend to cluster. They are exemplified by 
the contrast between Weber's formal definition of law and his ex-
tensive employment of the term 'legal'; and they can be summed 
up in two slogans: 'law is a coercive order' and 'the law regulates 
its own creation'. 130 
Thus Finnis appears to take a very liberally inclusive domain within 
which one can examine particular social phenomena "without ignor-
ing or banishing to another discipline the undeveloped, primitive, cor-
rupt, deviant, or other 'qualified sense' or 'extended sense' instances of 
the subject matter." 131 Indeed, Finnis accepts the intelligibility and 
usefulness of speaking of the law of a "gang", 132 although there is little 
to suggest that Finnis would be willing to extend that usage to include 
the interaction of the "gang" with outsiders. 133 
Had Finnis examined this matter more extensively, perhaps he 
would not have played down the significance of coercion as much as 
129. The point was presaged by Fuller, at least with regard to the various forms of social ordering 
characteristic of law. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357 
(1978). Contrary to at least one of Finnis's critics on this point, he does not claim that one cannot 
(logically) have any conception of law or legal systems which is not proffered as a normatively (morally) 
ideal conception. Cf. Gavison, supra note 127. 
130. J. FINNIS, supra note 119, at 270. 
131. Id. at II. 
132. Id. at 148. It has been known for some time, for example, that: 
[l]n the Mafia and Camorra, rules are adopted and orders are issued; there are regular ways 
of hearing charges of violation and rendering judgments, as by the Grand Council of the 
Camorra of Naples, followed by the action of previously designated personnel imposing 
very severe physical sanctions, including death, razor slashes across the face, severe beat-
ings, and the like, sometimes with the approval and support of the community. 
1. HALL, supra note 2, at 110 (citations omitted). 
133. It is worth mentioning, for example, that Peter Reuter has studied the mafia as a service 
agency for the resolution of disputes between outsiders arising from transactions in "illegal" markets. 
Informal talk, Center for the Study of Law and Society, U.C. Berkeley (October 3, 1980). 
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he does. This section concludes with an (unavoidably lengthy) exam-
ple which serves to illustrate how Finnis seems to fall into a potentially 
authoritarian strain of jurisprudence, manifesting the kind of flawed 
decisional process described in the introduction to this paper. 134 In his 
interesting discussion of the concepts of justice, Finnis rightly criti-
cizes a certain miscategorization (based upon a sixteenth century mis-
reading of Aquinas by Cajetan) of the types of justice, which leads to 
the erroneous conclusion that "distributive" justice pertains only to 
relations of the state to its citizens, whereas "commutative" justice 
pertains only to relations among the citizens. 135 The error is seen by 
recognizing that there are issues of distributive justice in the relation-
ships among citizens, and that there are commutative justice issues in 
the relationship of the state to the citizen. Though this point is fairly 
obvious, Finnis argues that missing it continues to be a common part 
of modem thinking. As confirmation of this claim, Finnis cites Robert 
Nozick's arguments in favor of an "entitlement" theory of justice in 
holdings and the argument against redistributive taxation that is de-
rived therefrom. 136 
Nozick's principle of justice in holdings is that holdings are just 
which are justly acquired from an unowned state or justly received 
from someone else who held them justly. Moreover, the only justifica-
tion for taking such just holdings from someone to give to another 
arises under a principle of "rectification" for a (sufficiently serious) 
wrong done to the recipient by the person being taken from, with ap-
propriate accounting for wrongs done between predecessors. Finnis 
criticizes this theory as manifesting the previously described erroneous 
view, in particular the view that relations between citizens invoke only 
commutative justice concerns. 137 There are several things wrong with 
Finnis's criticism. 138 Most importantly, for our purposes, Nozick fre-
134. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
135. J. FINNIS, supra note 119, § VII.6. Actually, the criticized view has a third dimension, not 
relevant to the present discussion: "legal justice" concerns the relationship of the citizen to the state 
and "is little more than the citizen's duty of allegiance to the State and its laws." Jd. at 186. For 
readers unfamiliar with the distinction between commutative and distributive justice, Fii:mis provides a 
good discussion. !d. §§ VII.3-VII. 7. 
136. See R. NOZICK, supra note 68, Ch. 7. 
137. J. F!NNIS, supra note 119, at 186-88. 
138. A point not directly germane to the present discussion but obvious enough to be mentioned 
is that Nozick clearly does not endorse the view that Finnis apparently attributes to him, for Nozick 
explicitly indicates a role, albeit a subsidiary one, for the principles of distributive justice in dealing with 
special problems of rectification - namely, situations in which the principle of rectification unaided by 
such distributive principles yields a non-unique prescription. See R. NoziCK, supra note 68, at 153n. 
Strikingly, Finnis ignores this caveat in exactly the kind of situation to which presumably it was di-
rected- the case of multiple creditors of an insolvent debtor. See J. FINNIS, supra note I 19, § VU.7. 
Conversely, outside the context of wealth transfers, Nozick's arguments emphasize the "moral side-
constraints" which limit the legitimate actions of everyone, including the state (R. NoZICK, supra note 
\W REVIEW [Vol. 57 
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uently reminds the reader that justice in terms of what may be re-
quired of someone under threat of coercion is distinct from justice in 
[erms of what one ought voluntarily to do; his entire book is concerned 
with the limitations upon the use of coercion as a means to various 
ends. 139 So it is hard to imagine Nozick denying that relations be-
tween citizens may indeed invoke distributive justice concerns. Yet, 
according to Nozick, such concerns do not figure directly in the justifi-
cation of coercive transfers of just holdings, not because such concerns 
~re unthinkable in this context, but primarily because if they were em-
ployed in this context, it would amount to a kind of enforced 
servitude. 140 
With these points in mind, consider the continuation of Finnis's 
criticism: 
[T]he plausibility of ... [Nozick's] argument comes entirely from 
its focus on the coercive nature of the State's intervention as the 
agent of (re)distributive justice. Suppose we abandon this perspec-
tive. That is to say: leave the State out of consideration for a mo-
ment, and ask instead whether a private property-holder has duties 
of (re)distributive justice. (The question is strictly inconceivable in 
the post-Cajetan tradition.) Then we will find that Nozick has lit-
tle indeed to say in favour of his assumption that what one has 
justly acquired one can justly hold without regard for the needs, 
deserts, or other claims of others (except such claims as one has 
actually created, e.g. by contract, which one has a duty to satisfy in 
what I, not Nozick, would call commutative justice). If we see no 
reason to adopt his assumption that the goods of the earth can 
reasonably be appropriated by a few to the substantial exclusion of 
all others, and if we prefer instead the principle that they are to be 
treated by all as for the benefit of all according to the criteria of 
distributive justice though partly through the mediation of private 
68, Part I, esp. Ch. 3); the obvious commutative justice concerns involved here belie the claim that 
Nozick adheres to a view giving no scope to such concerns in relations of the state to the citizen. 
"'!!~-~······· ... B ..eyond these points, I will avoid excessive digression by simply stating, without defense, that Finnis 
misunderstands Nozick's claim that "things" come into the world already attached to people having 
entitlements over them, so that both "distribution" and "redistribution" are misleading paradigms to 
invoke in describing the state's activities in the large scale transfer of wealth. See J. FINNIS, supra note 
119, at 187, esp. n.30. Moreover, Finnis's discussion fails to appreciate the significance of Nozick's 
endorsement of a "Lockean proviso" limiting acquisitions. See R. NOZICK, supra note 68, at 174-82. 
139. Nozick writes in his Preface: "Two noteworthy implications are that the state may not use 
its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, .... [O]nly coercive 
routes toward these goals are excluded while voluntary ones remain .... " R. NOZICK, supra note 68, 
at ix. And at the beginning of his discussion of "distributive" justice, he adds: "a principle of justice in 
holdings describes (part a/) what justice tells us (requires) about holdings." !d. at !50 (emphasis 
supplied). 
140. !d. at 167-74. Finnis explicitly recognizes this as the main thrust of Nozick's argument J. 
FINN IS, supra note I 19, at 186. 
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holdings, then the question of State coercion, which dominated 
Nozick's argument, becomes in principle of very secondary impor-
tance. For in establishing a scheme of redistributive taxation, etc., 
the State need be doing no more than crystallize and enforce duties 
that the property-holder already had. Coercion, then, comes into 
play only in the event of recalcitrance that is wrongful not only in 
law but also in justice. 141 
In view of Finnis's claim about conceptual confusion, he must be do-
ing more here than simply disagreeing with Nozick's opinions about 
distributional equity. It seems that Finnis is straightforwardly arguing 
that a moral obligation, at least if falling within the rubric of justice, is 
ipso facto an obligation which may properly be backed by coercive 
sanctions, such sanctions being "of very secondary importance." In so 
doing, it is clear that it is Finnis, not Nozick, who has stumbled as the 
result of a conceptual confusion. For even if one assumes that under 
appropriate circumstances a just (according to Nozick's principles of 
just acquisition al!d transfer) holder of entitlements has a moral duty 
(in justice) to distribute holdings to others, it does not follow (without 
more) that it is permissible to coerce him into making such a distribu-
tion. 142 At the very least, Finnis's criticism presupposes an unspeci-
fied resolution of the long-standing controversy about the enforcement 
of morality. 143 
III. SOME ELABORATION OF THE THESIS AND POTENTIAL 
OBJECTIONS 
In the theories discussed in the preceding section, one witnesses 
two countervailing tendencies. On the one hand there is the inclina-
tion, well explained by Finnis, to narrow the concept of law by pro-
gressively incorporating more of the "practical point" of proper legal 
enterprise into the very articulation of the nature of law. On the other 
hand there is the tendency, reflected variously in the works of the writ-
141. J. FINNIS, supra note I 19, at 187. 
142. I take it to be uncontroversial, or at least not controverted by Finnis, that while justice is not 
coextensive with morality, justice is also not coextensive with the morality of law. That is, there are 
moral concerns relevant to law which are not matters of justice, and there are justice concerns in many 
non-legal matters. See H. L.A. HART, supra note 52, at 153-63; cf J. FINNIS, supra note I 19, §VII. I. 
Thus, Finnis's conclusion is not analytically true by virtue of the meaning of 'justice'. 
143. See, e.g., J. FEINBERG, supra note 22, Chs. 2-3. The "something more" might be entailed in 
Finnis's peculiar reference in the quoted passage to the recalcitrance being "wrongful ... in law", but 
if so there is much more to be said than Finnis does here. It should also be clear that the foregoing 
criticism of Finnis, and pro tallto defense of Nozick, does not presume that Nozick's theory of justice in 
holdings is correct, though in fact I believe it largely to be. Finally, it has not been my purpose to argue 
that Finnis's conception of law logically requires the mistaken criticism of Nozick; just as Finnis was 
trying to show (in Nozick) the continuing influence of a sixteenth century mistake, I have tried to show 
(in Finnis) the continuing influence of a twentieth century mistake, a mistake of emphasis. 
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ers discussed, to open up the conception to comparative study which 
does not limit the connections to be developed or prejudge important 
practical issues. The present essay attempts to resolve this tension by 
accepting that these theorists have actually been pursuing two distin-
guishable but interrelated goals: that of specifying the scope of legal 
inquiry- the "province of jurisprudence", in Austin's terms- and 
that of developing, within such "province", more elaborated theories 
of law which can be useful in the analysis of the practical issues of 
h h . 144 concern to t e t eonst. 
By focusing upon the former goal, the attainment of which is ana-
lytically prior to the aitainment of the second, it has been argued that 
coercion is indeed as important as the early positivists seemed to sug-
gest, though not perhaps in exactly the way they suggested. We have 
observed the evolution of modern jurisprudential thought to a point 
where the imposition of rules by a robber gang is accepted, at least by 
some theorists, as an instance of legal phenomena. This reflects a sub-
tle forward stride in the process of unmasking putatively authoritative, 
but undeniably coercive, actions by the state. 145 Speculative legal 
thought, whether descriptive or prescriptive, must indeed take more 
seriously the normative question of the distinguishability of the gun-
man and the taxman as those persons are encountered in reality. We 
must, even if only as a tentative analytical device, look upon the em-
peror without the clothes of "authority". 146 Accordingly, legal theory 
should map out a domain of inquiry which properly reflects the quin-
tessential normative questions for legal philosophy, including in par-
ticular the justification of coercion 147 and of responses thereto. 148 It 
should be clear, then, that a much closer connection must be stressed 
144. See supra note 18. It is, of course, plausible to use the term "definition" to refer to either of 
these two goals; one can, for example, point out that elaborated descriptive or prescriptive theories 
attempt to "gain definition" with respect to law. 
145. This revision process has a long and distinguished history. See, e.g., A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS {1976) {first published in 1776); F. 
BASTIAT, SELECTED EsSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (1964) {first published between 1845 and 1850); 
A. HERBERT, THE RIGHT AND WRONG OF COMPULSION BY THE STATE {1976) {first published be-
tween 1880 and 1908); A NEW HISTORY OF LEVIATHAN (R. Radosh & M. Rothbard ed. 1972); F.A. 
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY {Vol. I 1973) {Vol. 2 1976) (Vol. 3 1979) (containing volu-
minous bibliographical notes). It has already been noted that Kelsen should be viewed in this light. See 
supra note 43. 
146. See, e.g., Nisbet, Cloaking the State's Dagger, REASON, October, 1984, at 42, an adaptation 
from the forthcoming FAIR OF SPEECH: THE USES OF EUPHEMISM, (D.J. Enright ed., Oxford U . 
Press). 
147. See generally J. FEINBERG, supra note 22. On the right to rule, see the articles by Ladenson 
and Raz, supra note 32, and R. NoziCK, supra note 68. Of course, one descriptive element within the 
normative inquiry, which would be central in the view of descriptive legal theory presented here, is the 
matter of the effectiveness of coercive sanctions in establishing conduct in conformity with rules. See, 
e.g., M. ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY {1970); C. STOl-lE, 
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between legal theory and political theory than has been generally rec-
ognized in modern legal philosophy. 149 
It may be objected, however, that I have misconstrued the contro-
versy surrounding the question, "What is law?" The main method-
ological thesis presented here focuses upon the sufficiency of coercion 
to place the interaction in question within the domain of inquiry. But 
many have taken the question to call for a specification of the "essen-
tial qualities" of law, or the necessary features of law. Indeed, it would 
seem that the criticism directed in this paper at legal decision-making 
programs which do not keep firmly in mind the coercive reality of the 
decision to be made presupposes that coercion is a necessary feature of 
law, if not of particular laws. 150 Moreover, several theorists have de-
veloped arguments demonstrating that social phenomena which lack 
coercion, yet ought to be considered law, can be hypothetically identi-
fied by focusing upon the needs of a society of angels. The general 
argument is that, even though sanctions would not be necessary to 
assure compliance in such a society, nevertheless basic coordination 
problems would still exist, due to honest differences of opinion, which 
would generate the practical need for authoritative resolutions suffi-
ciently "legal" in character to be appropriately called law. Conse-
quently, it is argued, coercion is not a conceptually (analytically) 
necessary feature either of law or a legal system, though it may be a 
naturally (pragmatically) necessary feature under any set of conditions 
mere mortals are likely to encounter. 151 This is an important point, 
according to Professor Oberdiek, because we may come to see 
that coercion and sanctions are over-used techniques for insuring 
compliance and that they may be largely replaced by promotional 
techniques. We can ... say now, on conceptual grounds, that law 
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); J. KAPLAN, THE 
HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983). 
148. See, e.g., Symposium, The Duty to Obey the Law, 18:4 GA. L. REV. (1984); M. RoTHBARD, 
THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982), esp. Cbs. 12, 24. For an interesting analysis of the significance of 
such questions for descriptive legal theory, see M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 18, esp. Ch. 5. 
149. A noteworthy .recent publication is generally responsive to the call made in this paper. 
Philip Soper's A THEORY OF LAW (1984) seems to carry the argument made here beyond the stage of 
determining the scope of inquiry to elaborating a theory (which unfortunately he calls a "definition"; 
see supra note 144 and accompanying text) of law which also attempts to draw lines of normative 
relevance. In doing so, Soper criticizes the modem positivists and natural lawyers on grounds similar 
at many points to those presented here. He also demonstrates the necessity of integrating legal and 
political theory by focusing upon the practical issues ofthe citizen's and the official's choices of what to 
do. The relative newness and depth of this work has precluded major treatment of its constructive 
component here. For a critical review, see Raz, The Morality of Obedience, 83 MICH. L. REv. 732 
(1985). 
150. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
151. See, e.g., Oberdiek, supra note 23, at 71; J. RAz, supra note 3, at 158-60; J. FINNIS, supra 
note 119, Cbs. IX-X, esp. 260-61. 
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· ot necessarily coercive, and we help establish systems in the 
IS n . . 152 
future which are noncoerc1ve m fact. 
Replying to these objections will allow us to complete the defini-
. nal structure for legal theory proposed here. First, it has been rec-
tiO ized for some time that "[i]t may well be the case that there is no 
ogn · f · 1 f · d" "d 11 essence of a legal system ~n the se~~e o a smg e set o ,m 1v1 ua y 
necessary and jointly sufficient cond1t10ns for the_ truth of A legal sys-
tem exists in S.' There may instead be several different, though over-
lapping, sets of sufficient conditions. In other words, there may be 
more than one way for something to qualify as a legal system." 153 Ad-
vocates of the "necessary conditions" approach may argue that one 
ought not to give up the search for necess_ary and jointly sufficient 
conditions absent a proof that they do not exist. Indeed, the argument 
that coercion is not necessary is usually framed in such a way as to 
suggest what is necessary. Thus, as in the recurring hypothetical soci-
ety of angels, the concept of coordination problems seems to isolate the 
necessary condition. 154 Yet, it would seem that another hypothetical 
society can be imagined in which there is no need for authoritative 
determination of rules - because everyone agrees on what they are 
and should be -but in which occasional weakness of will makes sanc-
tions practically necessary. 155 The argument against coercion, assum-
ing it is sound, thus seems equally applicable to the most likely other 
candidate for a necessary condition. 156 It remains rather problematic, 
152. Oberdiek, supra note 23, at 74. Similarly, Philip Selznick has made comparisons of legal 
development to Piaget's notion of individual development from a morality of constraint to a morality of 
cooperation. SeeP. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 18 et seq. (1969). Of course, 
one must be suspicious of suggestions that seem to entail a reduction in the coercive aspect of a legal 
system; they may entail merely shifting of the situs of coercion. For example, one could imagine a 
system employing "positive incentives" or "rewards" for persons to act in ways considered non-crimi-
nal, rather than imposing sanctions for criminal acts. But if one asks where the money to pay these 
rewards is to come from, one discovers that the coercion is simply to be shifted from the would-be 
criminals to the taxpayers opposed to the program - unless, of course, the reward system pays for 
itself by virtue of savings attributable, for example, to not having to put the criminal through the 
possibly more elaborate legal process necessary to impose a sanction. 
153. M. GOLDING, supra note 84, at 8. Professor Golding's approach in fact instantiates the 
possibility described in the quoted passages, although his sufficiency conditions do not resemble those 
described here. !d. at 9-17. His approach is not considered in detail here, in part because one of his 
conditions (it turns out to be a necessary condition) is the existence of laws, a condition which presents 
difficult problems of circularity. 
154. See generally E. ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977). 
155. Note that arguments in favor of the abdication of autonomy can be grouped into two analo-
gous categories: "(!) autonomy-abdication in exchange for significant benefits; (2) autonomy-abdica-
tion to protect against self-acknowledged irrationality." Kuf!ik, The Inalienability of Autanomy, 13:4 
PHIL & PuB. AFF. 271, 284 (1984). Compare Aquinas' two reasons for positive law, discussed in J. 
FtNNts, supra note 119, at 28-29. 
156. There are other reasons to doubt the definitional centrality of the coordination function of 
law. See Green, Law, Coordination. and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1983). 
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therefore, whether any condition or feature is conceptually necessary 
to law. 157 
Moreover, even if one or more necessary conditions, or even an 
"essence", can be identified at the level of construction of a full-blown 
theory of law, it can still be best to endorse the above-quoted view at 
the level of scope of inquiry determination. 158 The present paper does 
so, emphasizing one of the overlapping sufficiency conditions: the em-
ployment of coercion. In the process, we have adverted to another: 
the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules. 159 Following the advice of Fuller, the formulation of each con-
dition emphasizes the practical focus by use of an active terminology, 
thus reflecting the significance of human action in our normative delib-
erations. 160 If, therefore, one were to seek a slogan to characterize the 
theory presented here, (part of) it would be something like "law as the 
!57. Much more can be said on this point. See the very interesting article by Professors Beyleveld 
and Brownsword, supra note 59. 
158. Some of those who make the "necessity" argument appear to be aware of the separate need 
for a proper delineation of the scope of inquiry. Professors Beyleveld and Brownsword, for example, in 
setting the stage for their analysis of the positivism/natural law debate as a controversy over the proper 
"real" (i.e., "transcendental") definition or conception of law, specify that (following Fuller) "the gen-
eral subject matter of the study of law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance 
of rules". Beyleveld & Brownsword, supra note 59, at 100. On the other hand, reflecting the other 
sufficient condition endorsed here, their recharacterization of the debate as "morally legitimate power" 
vs. "socially organized power" retains the crucial concept of power as a common denominator for these 
rival "real" definitions. I d. at 8 I. Indeed, their natural law definitions include the following definition 
of the nature of a law: "Rule X is a law (is legally valid) if, and only if, there is a moral right to enforce 
X." Jd. at 82 (emphasis supplied). 
!59. Fuller has demonstrated, in effect, that this second sufficiency condition satisfies the two 
criteria developed in the first part of this paper. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20, 87-95. Of 
course, such an "enterprise" may include recourse to various "secondary" rules, principles, policies, 
and perhaps more. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 19, Chs. 2-4. Though there may be other suffi-
cient conditions, it would appear likely that most of the theorists considered in the foregoing pages 
would be satisfied with these two, assuming they were to take the overlapping-sufficiency-condition 
approach at all. In addition to the discussion in Part U of the text, see the compilation of other philoso-
phers who have shown similar inclinations, though usually in the form of conjunctive necessity condi-
tions rather than disjunctive sufficiency conditions, in Oberdiek, supra note 23, at 71-73. One 
conspicuous exception is Raz, who points to three features: normativity, coerciveness, and institutional-
ization. J. RAz, supra note 3. However, institutionalization is a complex attribute the normative rele-
vance of which is not at all obvious; it seems to be more appropriately considered as a contingent 
feature which legal systems, and other social phenomena, may have in varying degrees. See supra note 
5 I. In any event, most "institutions" will have component features which satisfy the sufficiency condi-
tions given here for the existence of law. 
160. See supra text accompanying note 88. Compare Jerome Hall's use of the term "law-as-
action", supra note 2, at !50 et seq. See also A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978). This 
characterization of the scope of inquiry appears neutral as between a focus upon 'laws' and one upon 
'legal system', but Raz is probably correct (at least in many cases and at the level of theory construc-
tion) in arguing that the concept of a law is best approached through an understanding of the concept 
of a legal system. J. R.Az, supra note 3, at 2 (I 980). But there are some analytical puzzles arising from 
the potential clash between a systemic focus, on the one hand, and the methodological individualism 
possibly latent in an active, purposive conception of law, on the other. See supra note I 10. 
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. d th " 1 , 161 
Il ion of coercwn an e use 01 ru es . II . 
Under such a view of the matter, it is accurate to say, for exam-
le that coercion is an essential concept in the understanding of fa\~.162 Further, one may characterize the satisfaction of both suffi-
ciency conditions as generating a category of paradigmatic, though not 
necessarily optimal, legal phenomena: viz., "law as the intersection of 
coercion and the use of rules." 163 Put less abstractly, the practical 
concerns which constitute the reasons for the study of law are the 
most pressing just when the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to 
the governance of rules involves or encounters the employment of co-
ercion.164 And with such a characterization, it would also make sense 
to say that coercion is a (logically) necessary feature of (paradigmatic 
cases of) law - a proposition quite distinct from, but possibly con-
fused with, the claim that law is in some definitional way required to 
employ coercion or that an instance of legal phenomena cannot be 
conceived which does not involve the employment of coercion. While 
a legal "system" may have components which fall within the non-par-
adigmatic categories, it is within these paradigmatic contexts that the 
important deci.sion-making has occurred in the past, occurs today, and 
will occur for the foreseeable future. 165 To that extent, at least, the 
views of the classical legal theorists, who emphasized the role of coer-
cion, are vindicated. 166 
16!. The phrase is reminiscent of Hart's "law as the union of primary and secondary rules". See 
supra note 52. However, Hart uses "union" in the common language sense of "combination", whereas 
I have used it in the set-theoretic sense indicating disjunctive sufficiency conditions for membership in a 
set. 
162. Oberdiek criticizes (supposedly) similar claims made by Aquinas and Kant. Oberdiek, supra 
note 23, at 72. 
163. One finds partial confirmation of this notion in anthropological and sociological definitions, 
such as Weber's definition of law: "An order will be called law if it is externally guaranteed by the 
probability that coercion (physical or psychological), to bring about conformity or to avenge violation, 
will be applied by a staff of people holding themselves specially ready for that purpose." M. WEBER, 
LAW AND ECONOMY IN SOCIETY 5 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954). 
164. Notice that the overlap, or intersection, concerns not only the governance through rules 
backed by coercion, but also the governance of coercion by rules. The former points, for example, to 
Fuller's (external) morality of duty (as to law), the latter to his (internal) morality of aspiration (as to 
law). See supra note 118. 
165. Compare Ronald Dworkin's comment about uses of the term "law" which make the posi-
tivists' claims true "by stipulation": 
But I [am] concerned with what I [take] to be an argument about the concept of law now in 
general employment, which is, I take it, the concept of the standards that provide for the 
rights and duties that a government has a duty to recognize and enforce, at least in princi-
ple, through the familiar institutions of courts and police. 
R. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 47. 
166. See supra note 2. It is worth pointing out that identifying a certain social system, process, 
rule, etc. as coercive does not necessarily mean that the social phenomenon in question is by and large 
repressive. Oberdiek has argued, for example, that to see legal systems as necessarily coercive is to miss 
the point that such systems can have a profoundly liberating effect. Oberdiek, supra note 23, at 92. But 
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It is manifestly sensible to take such an overlapping sufficiency 
approach, particularly when the issue is simply whether or not a given 
social phenomenon is properly within the scope of our legal inquiry, 
the scope which identifies the foci of our inquiry. The early positivists, 
we have seen, focused upon what we have called "paradigmatic" cases 
of law, while the modem positivists and natural lawyers tend to add 
an emphasis upon the non-coercive relatives of the paradigmatic cases. 
The present argument is that there is no good reason not to extend this 
consideration to the more purely coercive cousins. The extension pro-
vides a nice symmetry to the modem arguments, preserving the para-
digmatic category as that into which the ordinary language sense of 
'law' falls. It reminds us of the seriousness of the Janus-faced quality 
of law with which positivists and natural lawyers alike have strug-
gled.167 Perhaps most importantly, it encourages us to consider the 
possibility that a developed theory - prescriptive or descriptive in 
character- may (or may not!) be significantly different if it addresses 
the paradigmatic category than if it addresses either non-paradigmatic 
category defined by the satisfaction of one, but not the other, sufficient 
condition. 
As a final comment, one may be concerned that in this scheme 
there is an analytical priority of "ought" over "is" which may, if ex-
tended, lead to distortions of an "objective" picture of things. Cer-
tainly, the present proposal entails the acceptance of a certain kind of 
primacy of practical deliberations, particularly those of the official de-
cision-maker, the person facing the legal system's commands, and the 
social critic. And there are precedents of policy-oriented theorists 
who allow a particular normative theory to structure, perhaps exces-
sively, their descriptive theory. The main example that comes to mind 
is Bentham, who has been criticized for allowing his utilitarian re-
formism to lead him to mischaracterizing, for example, what it means 
to have a legal right. 168 However, before one can say what is or what 
ought to be in certain kinds of relations between people, one must 
often get a better picture of what the common subject matter of these 
issues is. In any event, the limited dimensions of the proposal made 
here suggest a demurrer to this challenge until such time as more con-
troversial components of a normative theory are introduced. 
It seems unlikely that recognition of the centrality of coercion, its 
this confuses "coercive" with "repressive" or "oppressive"; there is nothing incoherent or even implau-
sible about a coercive system which has an overall liberating effect. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, supra note 
145. CJ. Dewey, Force and Caercio11, 26 lNT'L J. ETHICS 359 (1916). 
!67. Cf. H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 113. 
168. See David Lyons's useful discussion of Hart's criticism of Bentham along these lines. Lyons, 
supra note I, at 727-32. 
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justification, and th~ justifica~ion o~ responses thereto, ~~mmits one in 
advance to any particular social philosophy or theory or JUstice, except 
insofar as it commits one to choosing among those theories which take 
the matter of coercion very seriously. H is to be hoped that legal the-
ory will benefit by the constant reminder that the practical purposes to 
which law is put, and thus as to which even descriptive legal theory is 
ultimately relevant, must satisfy the normative restraints which a just 
society would place upon the use of coercion. 
